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1.

Executive Summary

This research study considers the strengths and limits of a compliance-based approach to the regulation of
securities markets in Canada. The study analyses the viability of the compliance-based tools and
strategies currently employed in four specific areas of investor and regulatory concern and makes
recommendations for further development of the compliance-based approach to regulation.
Compliance is defined in this study as a regulatory style or set of specific strategies designed to enhance
market integrity. It focuses on ways of encouraging market participants to abide by norms of securities
laws by a combination of careful rule design as well as continued monitoring of market participants’
actual practices. The approach assumes that market participants will abide by rules that they perceive to
be legitimate. A summary of our specific recommendations is set out below.
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2.

Summary of Recommendations

Abusive Sales Practices
Recommendation #1: Securities Commissions and SROs should make greater efforts to educate
investors about market risks and who should bear the risk of loss when investment losses are
incurred in the marketplace. Greater education should also be provided on the importance of a
diversified portfolio.
Recommendation #2: Financial advisors and their firms should be required to disclose the risk
associated with any particular investment at the time that the transaction is entered into, in a
manner that is easily understood, and the effect of the transaction on the client’s overall portfolio in
terms of risk and diversification.
Recommendation #3: At the time of account opening, firms and financial advisors should be
required to disclose the following information in a brief (one- or two-page) document: (a) a list of
compensation options for the services that will be provided (whether or not available at that firm);
and (b) the particular compensation options available at the particular firm and by that advisor.
Recommendation #4: At the time of a particular transaction, the financial advisor should be
required to disclose, in a transaction summary document, the total dollar value of compensation the
investor has paid or is obligated to pay, directly or indirectly, to the advisor and his/her firm. Also
to be disclosed would be any compensation and benefits that will be received by the financial
advisor and the firm from third parties. Financial advisors should also be required to disclose the
dollar value of the compensation that would have been paid by the client had he/she selected
another compensation option for the relationship at the time of account opening, or another
compensation method for the particular transaction.
Recommendation #5: At year end, financial advisors should be required to disclose the total fees
paid by the client over the year as well as fees that would have been paid under other options.
Recommendation #6: Firms should be encouraged to impose higher standards of proficiency on
their employees than those currently required by regulators, as a part of their business model to
distinguish themselves from their competitors.
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Recommendation #7: Regulators should also consider imposing heightened proficiency
requirements and professionalism standards that currently required, to imbue a greater sense of
professionalism in the industry.
Recommendation #8: Regulators should mandate disclosure of the advisor’s educational
background and qualifications at the time of account opening, including any qualifications that are
above and beyond minimum regulatory requirements.
Recommendation #9: Regulators should require advisors to disclose to new and existing clients any
proven complaints of unsuitability and other abusive sales practices.
Recommendation#10: Regulators should require advisors to disclose proven claims of unsuitable
investments and other abusive sales practices to new and existing clients.
Recommendation#11: The compliance approach should not be used for persistent and egregious
offenders who continuously engage in abusive sales practices. Instead such offenders should be
removed from the industry.
Recommendation #12: Regulators should be encouraged to obtain retail investor input on how the
risk-based methodology for sales compliance audits is defined and what factors are considered
relevant in determining which firms become the subject of such audits.
Recommendation #13: Firms should be encouraged to use a risk-based approach internally within
their organizations to ensure that salespeople and branch offices are meeting the baselines expected
of them and also to identify and deal with particular sales people and/or branch offices that are
particularly troublesome in terms of the issue of abusive sales practices.
Recommendation #14: The IDA should be provided with statutory authority to compel third-party
witnesses to appear before it in regulatory proceedings, so as to enhance the effectiveness of its
enforcement proceedings.
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Insider Trading
Recommendation #15: Regulators should mandate that all reporting issuers develop and file an
explicit code of conduct dealing with prohibitions on insider trading and insider reporting policies.
Recommendation #16: The content of an IT policy should not be mandated by regulators, though it
most likely should include the introduction of routine “blackout periods”. It should also provide
some indication of how the issuer proposes to monitor ongoing adherence to its internal policy.
Recommendation #17: RIs should be encouraged to include, as an element of their IT policy, an
undertaking to make best efforts to inform RS of potential material changes that are reasonably
likely to occur.
Recommendation #18: Issuers and registrants should better educate their officers and employees
about the parameters of insider trading, such as when information is sufficiently “material” to
trigger the insider trading prohibitions. Issuers should also engage seriously in an ethics-building
process with respect to insider trading.
Recommendation #19: Issuers should give serious consideration to developing ongoing monitoring
capabilities in the area of insider trading, especially with respect to the granting or exercise of stock
options. This could include the appointment of a senior officer with responsibility for approving the
exercise of stock options.
Recommendation #20: Additional regulatory resources should be devoted to the enhancement of
technological tools for detecting or preventing insider trading activities.
Recommendation #21: Insider trading should be disclosed publicly in real time, as a further
deterrent to illegal insider trading and to enhance the market information available to retail
investors.
Recommendation #22: Regulators should adopt a risk-based approach to monitoring and
surveilling RIs for compliance with enhanced insider trading requirements.
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Primary Market Disclosure
Recommendation #23: A uniform definition of material fact should be adopted across the country
in the interest of ensuring compliance with the prospectus requirements. The distinction between
material fact and material change should be eliminated.
Recommendation #24: Regulators should engage in full or targeted review of only those
prospectuses for which they are the issuer’s principal regulator under MRRS, so as to expend their
resources efficiently and avoid duplicative review.
Recommendation #25: In light of the liberalization of the short-form prospectus eligibility
requirements, securities regulators should engage in more frequent and more in depth vetting of
short-form prospectuses (and continuous disclosure records) of those issuers who are not as closely
followed by market participants such as research analysts.
Continuous Disclosure
Recommendation #26: CD regulatory efforts should be refocused on reviewing internal control
systems, as opposed to primarily reviewing the content of specific CD documents.
Recommendation #27: Regulators should enhance RI capabilities with respect to CD by developing
a series of best practice templates for successful disclosure control and reporting systems, targeted
to areas of persistent CD deficiency.
Recommendation #28: Enforcement sanctioning by regulators should routinely involve orders that
RIs review their internal disclosure procedures and controls, with the additional requirement that
the results of this review and the action to be taken be reported to the regulator.
Recommendation #29: Regulators should consider additional publicity concerning the existence
and content of the Reporting Issuers in Default and Refilings and Errors lists that they maintain.
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Recommendation #30: Reporting issuers should be encouraged to participate in a number of
disclosure-related innovations, such as (i) disclosure sub-committees of the board, (ii) the
appointment of a disclosure compliance officer at senior management level (iii) enhanced disclosure
in MD&A documents about the existence and nature of internal disclosure control systems.
Conclusion
Recommendation #31: Additional research should be sponsored to provide detailed calculation of
the costs of compliance with external regulatory and internal self-regulatory initiatives, as well as
its qualitative and quantifiable benefits.
Finally, we note that none of the compliance strategies used on its own will achieve the desired outcome;
a comprehensive compliance strategy involves a mix of the various rule design, monitoring and incentivebased approaches.
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3.

Introduction

i.

Objective of this Research Study

This study was commissioned by the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada (Task
Force) under the auspices of its enforcement research theme. The goal of the project is to consider the
strengths and limitations of a compliance-based approach to regulating significant aspects of securities
markets operation in Canada. In doing this, the study considers the viability of specific compliance-based
tools and strategies currently employed in securities markets and makes recommendations for further
development of this approach to regulation. To lend some specificity to the analysis, the researchers have
identified a number of central areas where investors and regulators are concerned about market
participants’ adherence to regulatory requirements. We then use a case study method to assess the role
played by a compliance approach to regulation in each case, and make specific recommendations for
further enhancement. The case studies developed in the body of the report are those of: (i) abusive sales
practices; (ii) insider trading; (iii) primary market disclosure; and (iv) continuous disclosure.
ii.

Definitional Issues

It is important to specify from the outset what we mean by a compliance approach to securities regulation,
as the idea of compliance is used in a number of alternative ways in the literature on regulation. The idea
can be used simply and descriptively to signal the extent of compliance or non-compliance by market
participants with securities regulatory rules. More sociologically, it can refer to a set of values exhibited
by individuals or firms that guide their behaviour, for example, references to so-called “cultures of
compliance1”.
Somewhere between these two ideas is the sense in which we use compliance in this study; that is, as a
regulatory style or a set of specific strategies to achieve the desired regulatory outcomes.
The idea of compliance as a regulatory style has a number of components. In the first place, it tends to
focus on ways of encouraging market participants to abide by norms of securities law by a combination of
1

In so far as this report will address strategies for generating “cultures of compliance” within organizations, it will
focus primarily on the contribution that legal rules and regulatory strategies can make to the development of such
cultures, rather than the influences on organizations of broader sociological, anthropological or cultural factors.
While these broader questions are fascinating, they are largely beyond the scope of this project. See Ronald B. Davis
“Fox in SOX North, A Question of Fit: The Adoption of United States Market Solutions in Canada” [2004] Vol
XXXIII Stetson Law Review 955 at 990.
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careful rule design as well as continued monitoring of the extent to which market participants are in fact
abiding by these rules. In this sense, compliance is often characterized - not entirely accurately - as a
proactive rather than a reactive approach to regulation. It also tends to assume that market participants
will abide by rules that they perceive to be legitimate and whose rationale is explained to them. In this
sense, a compliance-based approach to regulation is often contrasted in the academic literature with a
deterrence-based approach, which tends to assume that market actors will break the law if it is in their
self-interest to do so, with the implication that what is necessary to prevent this from happening is
rigorous sanctioning. More recently, a compliance orientation to regulation has focused on ways to embed
compliance within organizational routines, as opposed to an emphasis on uncovering and punishing
individual malfeasance, based on assumptions about the motivations of individual behaviour.
Given this brief description of a compliance orientation to regulation, it may immediately be noted that a
study that purports to examine the feasibility and expansion of such an approach to regulation will involve
a broader lens than examining enforcement practices per se, as it is the case that in many securities
regulatory bodies, compliance activities are organizationally separated from enforcement activities. This
is as true of the dominant self-regulatory organizations in Canada as it is of provincial regulators. In other
words, a fuller sense of the strategies that may be useful to promote acceptable market behaviour will
require a look beyond the activities of enforcement departments per se. It also suggests that an important
component of the research should be an understanding of how, in practice, compliance departments
within regulatory organizations interact with enforcement departments.
iii.

The Case for Compliance

It is no secret that effective enforcement of securities regulation is an intensely debated topic in Canada,
and North America more generally. So far, the predominant response of Canadian regulators has been to
attempt to engage in, and demonstrate, an increasingly punitive style of enforcement. This has been
reflected in legislative changes to the Criminal Code, and even more importantly in regulators across the
country seeking and obtaining an increasing range and severity of enforcement powers2. However it is
arguably unclear that this will result in better outcomes for securities markets, if these are defined in terms
of the achievement of fair and efficient markets that operate with integrity3. The strategy of attempting to
improve market behaviour by imposing harsher sanctions in contested enforcement actions may fail. This

2

Examples include the recent acquisition by the OSC of the power to levy an administrative penalty, or order
disgorgement of profits. See OSA s.127(1)#9&10
3
See OSA s.1.1.
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may come about for a number of reasons. One possibility is that this form of enforcement activity
imposes such a high cost on regulators in terms of the resources it consumes that they may be unable to
subject all significant breaches that come to their attention to rigorous sanctioning, thereby exposing
themselves to a loss of legitimacy as a protector of investor interests. Another is that regulators lose
legitimacy among the regulated community because their processes fail to provide the adequate amount of
due process or because they are perceived to usurp the role of criminal courts.
A different order of possibility is that a regulatory enforcement style that focuses on deterrence may fail
to achieve its desired outcomes because deterrence is an inadequate theory of the motivations of human
behaviour. This is to say that there is some uncertainty that deterrence-type sanctions do in fact achieve
the results of reorienting market participant behaviour4. In this respect, we would point to the comments
of the Charles Rivers Associates study conducted for the Wise Persons Committee in 20035 to the effect
that “it is very difficult to measure deterrence effects of enforcement activity”. We also note the
suggestion in the financial regulation literature that the salutary effect of publicity is greater at the time
regulators launch an investigation than it is at the time the sanction is ultimately applied. Discussing the
approach of the U.K.’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) to enforcement, Turner argues that
“the imposition of public discipline would have the effect of improving the compliance
culture within an organization… Unfortunately, publicity surrounding the issue often
relates to events that happened some time ago and therefore the effect would be
diminished….the more persuasive argument as to where the driver for an improvement in
compliance culture emerged was FSA publicity at the time that it was announced that the
FSA was intending to investigate a particular issue or event”. 6
It was also suggested in discussions at the Task Force- and CMI-sponsored roundtable on enforcement in
February 2006 that deterrence effects might be quite idiosyncratic, in that negative publicity about a
sanctioning decision made against a market actor does not necessarily result in a significant loss to that
actor’s reputation among investors.
4

See Dorothy Thornton, Neil A. Gunningham and Robert A. Kagan “General Deterrence and Corporate
Environmental Behaviour” (2005) 27(2) Law and Policy 262; Tom R. Tyler “Promoting Employee Policy
Adherence and Rule Following in Work Settings” (2005) 70 Brooklyn Law Review 1287
5
For the details of their argument see Charles Rivers Associates “Securities Enforcement in Canada: The Effect of
Multiple Regulators” in Doug Harris, ed. Wise Persons Committee Research Studies 458 at 477
6
See Turner Vol 13(2) Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance p. 142 at 144 and 145. Some of this
problem might be mitigated by the strategic deployment of a settlement outcome, which would likely occur faster
than a hearing-driven result, but settlements as an enforcement strategy also dilute the supposed salutary effects of
harsh sanctioning.
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This report seeks to contribute to the debate about how to achieve effective regulatory outcomes by
suggesting that a reorientation of the regulatory approach to more proactive, ongoing, organizationally
embedded monitoring might be a useful corrective. The underlying premise is that if compliance-type
strategies can be expanded, or rendered more successful, this may reduce the need for back-end, reactive
enforcement7.
iv.

What Kinds of Compliance-Based Strategies Are There?

In preparing this report, we have found useful a policy paper sponsored by the OECD on the topic of how
to achieve regulatory compliance in a variety of contexts, and we use the insights from this report to
frame some of our recommendations8. The OECD report’s analysis begins with an account of three
alternative explanations for non-compliance with regulation. These are: (i) the degree of market
participants’ knowledge of regulatory requirements; (ii) the degree of market participants’ willingness to
comply (whether because of economic incentives, good citizenship or other explanations); and (iii) the
degree of their ability to comply. This suggests that comprehensive recommendations for improving
market integrity outcomes need to address each of these potential causes of non-compliance.
In a somewhat different vein, we also note that organizations of all kinds have begun increasingly to
operate by seeking to identify the sources of the most important risks they face (such as competitive risks,
operational risks, legal risks and so on), and to prioritize planning around reducing or eliminating those
risks. Such an approach encourages organizations to be reflective about the ways in which scarce
resources can be used most effectively, and suggests a guideline for how both regulators and participants
in securities markets should act. Adopting a risk-based approach, regulators would concentrate resources
on eliminating behaviours that pose the most risk to the market,9 and market participants would organize
their internal activities to reduce or eliminate their sources of risk exposure, whether that be the risk of
reputational damage, financial loss, regulatory sanction or liability. The compliance-based tools and
strategies we enumerate briefly below, and discuss in more detail in the various case studies, can assist in
operationalizing a risk assessment approach to regulatory or market activity.

7

Jonathan Edwards and Simon Wolfe “Compliance: A review” (2005) 13(1) Journal of Financial Regulation and
Compliance p.48 at 56.
8
Christine Parker “Reducing the Risk of Policy Failure: Challenges for Regulatory Compliance” Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2000 [hereinafter OECD report].
9
A number of major securities regulators have adopted this approach, such as the FSA in the U.K. See Julia Black
“Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Processes: The Example of UK Financial Services Regulation” at p.8.
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Compliance strategies, of course, are varied. For example, one general approach underlying compliancebased strategizing is to change behaviour or decisions by changing the incentive structures within which
those decisions will be made. The Ontario Securities Commission’s (OSC) “credit for cooperation” policy
is one enforcement-related example of this type of strategy. Another quite different approach would be to
use technology to modify behaviour by controlling the actions that can be accomplished. A simple
example of the latter is the way that the TSX’s trading platform prevents a short-sale order being entered
on a down tick10.
Common compliance-based strategies include the following:
·

the requirement to establish written policies to guide action, (such as compliance manuals) and to
document actions taken, for example with respect to disclosing material changes;

·

the establishment of sub-committees of a board of directors to oversee the organization’s
compliance with legal requirements (such as so-called compliance committees);

·

the designation of compliance officers responsible for monitoring detailed compliance with
regulatory requirements on a day-to-day basis;

·

an emphasis on ongoing programmes of staff education about regulatory requirements and their
implementation within the firm;

·

external auditing of organizational processes: the most obvious example of auditing is in relation
to financial statements but it can be used in a broader sense, such as for example, the idea of a
“social audit”;

·

gatekeeper involvement: the deployment of third parties to assess the compliance of firms with
regulatory requirements (for example, the role of underwriters and legal counsel in the prospectus
process); and

·

self-reporting policies: the adoption of regulatory policies or rules that provide incentives (often
in the form of reducing or eliminating sanctions) to the regulated to self-report breaches of
regulatory requirements.

v.

Limits of Compliance

However there are limits to the role of a compliance orientation as a complete agenda for producing
acceptable market behaviour. One shortcoming that might be perceived is that compliance-based
10

Doing this would be an infringement of the Universal Market Integrity Rule (UMIR) that requires short selling
only on an uptick. See Universal Market Integrity Rules (UMIRs) s.3.1(1)
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strategies are by definition more low-visibility and routinized than high-profile prosecutorial-style action.
Their expansion might therefore open regulators to the charge that they are “not doing enough” to
regulate the market appropriately. A more intractable problem is the fact that it may be just as hard to
measure the effects of compliance-type strategies on market behaviour, as it is to assert that deterrencetype strategies work to minimize rule-breaking behaviour. On the other hand, a feature of compliance
strategies is that they tend to involve the collection of ongoing data about what organizations and the
individuals within them are doing. They therefore allow for trends to emerge about rule-abiding
behaviour. For example, the Corporate Finance branch of the OSC publishes the “outcomes” of its
compliance activities in its annual report11. It is presumably possible to thereby assess trends in
compliance from year to year, and perhaps even measure the effects on compliance that an enhanced rule
requirement might have.
A further obvious problem is the potential costs that would be incurred by issuer and registrant
organizations by the imposition of enhanced compliance-type requirements. Insofar as compliance
strategies may impose more detail and formality on a variety of operational routines, or require the
deployment of additional human resources, those costs will be borne by issuers or registrants across the
capital markets in general, including those organizations which are generally law-abiding anyway. On the
other hand, an approach to enforcing securities law that focuses more on reactive investigations and
sanctioning processes will impose more specific costs on regulatory and public resources.
In addition, we acknowledge that an unintended consequence of a rigorous compliance programme might
be that these requirements become a way for larger issuers to preserve a monopoly, in the sense that they
are better able to meet the costs of compliance initiatives and so can drive out smaller operations12.
These are challenging problems and pose some difficulty in light of the fact that it is beyond the scope of
this work to attempt to quantify the costs of a variety of compliance strategies, and relate them to the costs
of a sanctions-based approach13. We would note, though, that ex post, reactive sanctioning is a relatively
blunt instrument for producing compliant behaviour among market participants, even if one assumes that
market participants will be influenced to change their behaviour as a result of knowing that harsh
sanctions are being imposed for some breaches of securities law. In a context in which it appears that
11

For example, how many issuers committed to “disclosure enhancements in future filings”; how many were placed
on the default list; how many restated their filings.
12
See Andrei Shleifer “Understanding Regulation” (2005) 11(4) European Financial Management 439 at 446.
13
Further information will be available about the costs of enforcement strategies in Canada as a result of Professor
Howell Jackson’s research for the Task Force.
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investors, especially retail investors, have a low tolerance for incidents of wrongdoing in capital markets,
and are motivated to seek investments where good corporate governance and a commitment to social
responsibility are a factor, it is worthwhile to consider the contribution that effective compliance-based
regulation can make to producing market integrity. The foregoing does suggest, however, that more
manageable compliance strategies will be those that require issuers to deviate as little as possible from a
focus on their ongoing business activities.
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4.

Case Study #1: Abusive Sales Practices

i.

Introduction

Financial intermediation is extremely important in the context of the Canadian capital markets. The IDA
has over 200 investment dealer firms as members and close to 28,000 registered individuals who handle
approximately $35 million in transaction value annually.14 The MFDA regulates 177 firms and 68,434
registered salespeople with close to $279 billion of AUA. 15 Sales practices go to the heart of the
enterprise of investing in the capital markets, and it is an area of intense interest among self-regulatory
organizations, both the IDA and MFDA, as well as the provincial securities commissions.
The puzzle we analyze in this case study is the persistence of investor complaints around inappropriate
investments and what investors perceive as mistreatment by sales personnel, despite many layers of
compliance requirements and a very high level of firm-compliance tools and regulatory oversight. When
considered in the context of the transaction value and assets under advisement, the absolute number of
complaints of unsuitability (set out below) levelled against advisors is relatively small. However, the
relationship between investor and advisor appears to be a significant source of frustration amongst retail
investors, as noted at the OSC Town Hall meeting last year. As discussed in detail below, there may also
be a mismatch of expectations between investors and their advisors. Nonetheless, the issue of unsuitable
investments has a particular impact on retail investors and fundamentally affects their confidence levels
and perception about the fairness and integrity of the financial intermediation system in Canada.
ii.

Data on Complaints on Unsuitable Investments

Of the 1,841 events reported by IDA member firms via Comset16 in 2005, 39% (or 732) dealt with the
subject of unsuitable investments.17 Table 1 shows that this percentage has been dropping since 2003 at
which time it represented almost half of all events filed on COMSET.

14

IDA Enforcement Annual Report 2005 at 15.
MFDA website. http://www.mfda.ca/members/memberstats.html. (Last accessed March 9, 2006).
16
The IDA requires member firms to report all client complaints and disciplinary matters, including internal
investigations, disciplinary actions, settlements, and civil, criminal or regulatory action against the firm or its
registered employees, using ComSet, the database built to received and store such events filed by Members.
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IDA Enforcement Annual Report 2005 at 4.
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Unsuitable investments were also one of the top four types of complaints received by the IDA complaints
department in 2005 at 17%.18 Table 2 show that complaints received by the IDA have also been dropping
as a percentage, being at 23% in 2002.
Complaints of unsuitable investments were one of the top four issues referred to the investigation
department at the IDA in 2005.19 However, it is not one of the top 4 issues referred for prosecution.
Table 1: Complaints filed on COMSET by IDA Members
Year

Total Events Filed

2003
2004
2005

2,670
1,896
1,841

Unsuitable
Investments
1,248
785
732

Percentage

Unsuitable
Investment
Complaints
243
281
203
222

Percentage

47%
41%
39%

Table 2: Complaints received by the IDA

iii.

Year

Total Complaints Received

2002
2003
2004
2005

1,073
1,575
1,315
1,271

23%
18%
15%
17%

The Regulatory Framework

The know-your-client and suitability requirements are at the heart of the retail advisory relationship. IDA
and MFDA rules require that when recommending to a customer the purchase, sale, exchange or holding
of any security, the member must use due diligence to ensure that the recommendation is suitable for the
customer, based on factors including the customer’s financial situation, investment knowledge,
investment objectives and risk tolerance.20
Layered on top of the suitability requirement is a rule that requires each member firm to designate a
director, partner or officer, or in the case of a branch office, a branch manager, who is responsible for

18

IDA Enforcement Annual Report 2005 at 5 and 7.
IDA Enforcement Annual Report 2005 at 8.
20
See for example, IDA Regulation 1300.(1).(q). Members can obtain an exemption from making a suitability
determination if no recommendation is provided.
19

21

opening new accounts and supervising account activity.21 He/she “shall ensure that the handling of client
business is within the bounds of ethical conduct, consistent with just and equitable principles of trades
and not detrimental to the interests of the securities industry”.22
IDA Policy 2 and MFDA Policy 2 set out minimum requirements for retail account ongoing supervision
at the branch office and head office level.23 The compliance requirements are premised on the assumption
that the stockbroker receives a commission for trades placed by a client.24 The SRO policies require,
among other things, that members establish their own written policies to document supervision
requirements, 25 and maintain evidentiary documentation of supervisory reviews (inquiries made, replies
received, actions taken, date of completion, etc) for seven years. The policies also require member firms
to engage in ongoing reviews of sales compliance procedures and practices at head office and at branch
offices26 and engage in closer supervision of trading by approved persons who have had a history of
questionable conduct at both the branch and head office levels.27
Branch office compliance requirements include daily and monthly reviews. The branch manager is
required to undertake certain activities on a daily and monthly basis for the purpose of assessing
compliance with regulatory requirements and the member firm’s own policies. The branch manager is
required to review the previous day’s trades to attempt to detect lack of suitability; excessive trading
activity; conflict of interest between registered representative and client trading activity; inappropriate
high risk trading strategies; and quality downgrading of client holdings, among other things.28 In addition
to transactional activity, the branch manager is required to keep him/herself informed of other client
matters including client complaints.29 The branch manager is required to conduct monthly reviews of
statements of clients, which produce gross commissions of $1,500 or more for the month.
Head office compliance also involves daily and monthly reviews. Under IDA rules, head office is
required to conduct daily reviews of stock trades of transactions of significant value. For those shares
with a price under $5 a share, the threshold is any transaction over $5,000. For shares over $5 a share,
21

IDA Regulation 1300.(2)
IDA Regulation 1300.(2)
23
See MFDA Bulletin at http://www.mfda.ca/regulation/notices/MR-0037.pdf . (Last accessed March 10, 2006).
24
Member firms are required to develop supervisory policies for the review of non-commission based accounts (fee
based accounts) at the branch and head office in lieu of the commission levels specified in the relevant rule.
25
IDA Policy 2, Section 1.A.
26
IDA Policy 2, Section I.B.2.
27
IDA Policy 2, Section I.B.3.
28
IDA Policy 2, Section III.A.1.
29
IDA Policy 2, Section III.A.2.
22
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head office must review transactions with a trade value of over $20,000. Recognizing that branch
managers have a conflict in terms of reviewing their own trades, IDA rules require that head office review
all client accounts of producing branch managers. IDA rules also require head office to review clients’
statements which generated more than $3,000 commission during the month.30
SRO Policies also require their members to establish procedures to deal effectively with client
complaints, including acknowledging all written complaints, and conveying the results of their internal
investigation of a client complaint to the client. Members are also required to have to appropriate internal
disciplinary procedures as well as procedures in place so that “senior management is made aware of
complaints of serious misconduct and of all legal actions”31 Firms are also required to report all client
complaints and their resolution to the SRO via ComSet. Client complaints regarding unauthorized
trading, fraud, forgery, or market manipulation must be reported even if the complaint is not in writing.
SROs also impose a requirement that each member firm have a Chief Compliance Officer (CCO). IDA
Bylaw 38, for example, states that the CCO is responsible for designing and implementing a reasonable
supervision and compliance system that can give the board of directors assurance that IDA rules and all
other rules are being reasonably complied with. While the rule is mandated, much about the role and
responsibility of the CCO and the appropriate system is left to the organization, as it probably should be.
Nonetheless, securities regulators are currently devising a CCO examination so that there are some
consistent proficiency standards across the industry.
The SROs engage in a number of proactive compliance-based strategies that reinforce the specific rules
they have promulgated. The on-site periodic sales compliance examination or review by the IDA and
MFDA is one such tool. For example, the MFDA just completed its first round of sales compliance
review of all member firms over the last three years. The IDA uses a risk-based methodology which it
states in its 2005 Annual Enforcement Report “has made the tailoring and prioritization of on-site
examination programs much more precise, and therefore effective, processes”.32 The IDA categorizes
members into nine distinct Peer Groups, which allows the SRO and the member to compare and contrast
performance results between firms with similar profiles.33
30

IDA Policy 2, Section IV.B.1.
IDA Policy 2, Section VIII.3.
32
Member Regulation Sales Compliance Annual Report 2005 IDA at 1.
33
The Sales Compliance Risk Profiles by Peer Group are: Group 1- Integrated; Group 2- Retail, General; Group 2.2
– Retail Type 2 IB; Group 3 – Portfolio Managers; Group 4 – Discounters; Group 5 – Institutional Traders; Group 6;
Corporate Finance; Group 7 – ATS; Group 8 – Other. See Member Regulation Sales Compliance Annual Report
2004 at 2.
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In 2005, the IDA Annual Sales Compliance Report notes that frequent findings in sales compliance
reviews continued to include failure to maintain up-to-date policies and procedures. It also noted that
“patterns of sub-optimal supervisory practices” appeared to be on the rise. The explanation that is offered
for this trend is that “the confluence of increasingly hectic markets, new and more complex investment
products and rising regulatory requirements appeared to overtake the resources being fielded by Members
in question”. The 2005 IDA Report also noted that customer account documentation deficiencies
continued to be a “frequent finding of reviews” including non-compliant forms. Another area of frequent
deficiency findings was controls over advertising and sales literature, often on websites.
The 2003 IDA Annual Sales Compliance Report also notes that inadequate documentation of internal
compliance activity and findings was a frequent finding. “Some Members, while they conduct adequate
account reviews under Policy 2 and deal with problems uncovered, fail to adequately document what is
done and found. The failure makes it difficult to determine whether the reviews are in fact being done as
required by Policy 2 and leaves the Member under-protected in the event of a client complaint or
lawsuit”.34
Most findings from SRO on-site examinations are handled by the SRO compliance department
informally, but pervasive or egregious breaches that are uncovered are referred to the SRO enforcement
departments for informal administrative action or formal processes.
iv.

Analysis

Despite what appears to be a multi-pronged compliance framework, as discussed above, there remains a
persistence of complaints centred around unsuitable investments. A number of observations and
recommendations are set out below for the Task Force’s consideration.
a)

Relationship between Complaint Levels and Market Conditions

There appears to be an inverse relationship between the frequency of complaints by investors of
unsuitable investments and general market conditions. As noted in Tables 1 and 2 above, the total level of
complaints received as well as specific complaints on suitability have been decreasing since 2003. There
is anecdotal evidence that suggests the number of complaints and, in particular, complaints about
34

Member Regulation Sales Compliance Annual Report 2003 IDA at 3.
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suitability are directly related to how buoyant the markets are. That is to say, there appears to be a
marked increase in the number of complaints and suitability complaints in step, albeit somewhat delayed,
as between a bull market and a bear market. It is reasonable to assume that people take a more critical
look at their account statements if there are losses in their investments or there has been a reduction in
returns. Given the markets have been providing reasonably good returns in each of the past successive
years, this may be a partial explanation to the downward trend of complaints generally and of unsuitable
investments in particular. The general reaction on unsuitability appears to be decrease as market
conditions improve. More claims of unsuitability are generated when investors lose a percentage of their
portfolio in the markets.35
This analysis suggests that greater efforts should be made by commissions and SROs to educate investors
about market risks and losses and the appropriate bearing of responsibility when an investment has
negative returns. We recommend that investor education resources be focused on this topic. Consideration
should also be given to requiring financial advisors to specifically disclose the risk associated with
entering into a particular transaction before the transaction is entered into, and its effect on the client’s
overall portfolio in terms of risk, return and diversification. There is currently no standard terminology
used in the industry to describe risk. Firms and individual advisors are free to use a broad variety of
terms that may mean different things to different people. There should be some standardization of risk so
that it can be clearly articulated and understood. It should also be noted that assessing risk only at the time
of the transaction can be potentially dangerous. Investments are dynamic and the risks associated with
them vary over time. As such, consideration should also be given to a continuing obligation to disclose
the relevant risks post-purchase on a client’s periodic statements.
Recommendation #1: Securities Commissions and SROs should make greater efforts to educate
investors about market risks and who should bear the risk of loss when investment losses are
incurred in the marketplace. Greater education should also be provided on the importance of a
diversified portfolio.

35

Generally, complaints are linked to monetary loss suffered by a client, but that is not necessarily exclusively so.
In rare circumstances, clients do complain that they have been put into unsuitable investments on the basis that they
did not make enough money or they would have made more money had they been put in proper investments.
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Recommendation #2: Financial advisors and their firms should be required to disclose the risk
associated with any particular investment at the time that the transaction is entered into, in a
manner that is easily understood, and the effect of the transaction on the client’s overall portfolio in
terms of risk, return and diversification.
b)

Disclosure of Compensation

We strive for investment advice to be provided and investment decisions to be made on the basis of the
client’s best interests and the client’s risk tolerance and expected return. In a well-functioning market, we
also expect strong price competition for financial intermediation services that are rendered.
There appears to be a fair amount of disclosure of fees in the context of secondary market trading of
shares, as noted the Fair Dealing Model Concept Paper. 36 For example, discount brokers generally
highlight their trading fees upfront. Full-service brokers generally provide commission amounts on
transaction confirmation slips post-trades. However, there are many problems with the current system in
respect of compensation. A few examples are set out below:
·

In the context of IPOs, investment banks generally offer their financial advisors higher
compensation than secondary trades to sell the IPO, which is not problematic per se, but can skew
a financial advisor’s advice to a client.37

·

While commissions are generally not charged on trading in bonds, some investors may not be
aware that the firm and advisor are being compensated through the buy-sell spread. 38

·

The complexity and lack of transparency of mutual fund fees (including multiple sources and
multiple time periods) make it difficult for an investor to have a good appreciation of the actual
costs associated with their investment. The fact that the financial advisor and his/her firm may
receive large fees from a third party source may also create a conflict of interest that is
detrimental to the client.39 The fact that the fees are disclosed but often buried in a lengthy
prospectus makes such disclosure meaningless in many cases.

36

The Fair Dealing Model, Concept Paper of the Ontario Securities Commission (January 2004). See also
Glorianne Stromberg, Investment Funds and Consumer Protection Strategies for the Millennium (1998) and
Glorianne Stromberg, Regulatory Strategies for the Mid-90s: Recommendations for Regulating Investment Funds in
Canada.
37
Fair Dealing Model, at 63.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
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It must be acknowledged that deep-rooted individual and organizational compensation incentives can
have an impact on an individual advisor’s recommendations to a client to buy, sell or hold certain
securities. 40 The advisor’s interests can be skewed in favour of those products that will offer him/her a
larger commission or compensation package. These concerns are exacerbated particularly in a context
when there are multiple sources of fees and the fees are not disclosed in an easily accessible way to the
investor before the investment is made.
How should securities laws address the issue of conflicts of interest in the context of compensation
biases? In certain contexts, regulators view the conflict to be so grave that they create a bright line rule
prohibiting the activity. For example, IDA Rule 11 clearly sets out that research analyst compensation
cannot be tied to the profitability of the investment bank. Certain forms of compensation are also
prohibited in the mutual fund context.
Commission-based compensation structures are certainly the cause of some of the concerns noted above,
but that is not to say that other compensation models, such as flat-fee accounts, are the panacea, as they
create different but equal problems in respect of differing interests between the advisor and the client. 41
It is unlikely that Canadian regulators will be prepared to prohibit all commission-based sales practices
across the board, and we do not go so far as to recommend prohibition in this study. In the context of
compensation of financial advisors, we do, however, recommend greater transparency and more
accessible disclosure of the fees to investors at critical stages in the advisor-client relationship. The
recommendations discussed below should allow investors to make informed decisions and also may
encourage greater competition in the industry.
At the time of account opening, firms and financial advisors should be required to disclose in a brief
document a list of compensation options for the services that will be provided (whether or not they are
available at that firm), and the particular compensation options available at that firm and by that advisor.
We encourage intermediaries to make available to clients multiple options for compensation, including
non-commission based options.

40

See, for example, Donald Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral
Economics about Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 627 (1996).
The data shows that commissions on trades account for 59% of revenues of full-service brokers in Canada, while flat
fees on accounts account for 29%. However, fee-based accounts are on the rise. Spreads accounted for 10% of
revenues and “other” accounted for 2%. See Earl Bederman, Investor Economics, ‘Canada’s Wealth Management:
Opportunities and Challenges for Retail Brokerage” (June 15, 2004) at 15.
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At the time of any particular transaction, the financial advisor should be required to disclose, in a brief
transaction summary document, the total dollar value of the compensation the investor has paid or is
obligated to pay, directly or indirectly, to the advisor and his/her firm. Any compensation and benefits
that will be received by the financial advisor and the firm from third parties should also be required to be
disclosed. Finally, financial advisors should also be required to disclosure the dollar value of the
compensation that would have been paid by the client had he/she selected another compensation option
for the relationship at the time of account opening, or another compensation method for the particular
transaction. It must be stressed that the document should contain sufficient information that is provided in
a succinct, clear document that relies on plain language that is understandable to the average, educated,
reasonable investor. However, if it is more than one or two pages, it is unlikely that most people will read
it.
At year-end, financial advisors should be required to disclose the total fees paid by the client over the
year, as well as fees that would have been paid under other options, so that the client can choose to
change the compensation model on a going-forward basis.
Recommendation #3: At the time of account opening, firms and financial advisors should be
required to disclose the following information in a brief (one- or two-page) document: (a) a list of
compensation options for the services that will be provided (whether or not available at that firm);
and (b) the particular compensation options available at the particular firm and by that advisor.
Recommendation #4: At the time of a particular transaction, the financial advisor should be
required to disclose, in a brief (one- or two-page) transaction summary document, the total dollar
value of compensation the investor has paid or is obligated to pay, directly or indirectly, to the
advisor and his/her firm. Also to be disclosed would be any compensation and benefits that will be
received by the financial advisor and the firm from third parties. Financial advisors should also be
required to disclosure the dollar value of the compensation that would have been paid by the client
had he/she selected another compensation option for the relationship at the time of account
opening, or another compensation method for the particular transaction.
Recommendation #5: At year end, financial advisors should be required to disclose the total fees
paid by the client over the year as well as fees that would have been paid under other options.
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c)

Financial Advisors’ Proficiency and Publicity of Proven Complaints of Abusive Sales
Practices

Consideration should also be given to replacing the current salesperson mentality, which is often
underscored by the commission system of compensation noted above, with one that encourages increased
professionalism and independent advice. Currently, certain classes of salespeople can sell securities with
very little formal education and after completing courses which can take only a few months. There is also
no formal period of apprenticeship, which can offer benefits of mentorship and role modelling of good
behaviour and practices. Firms should be encouraged to take the initiative to impose higher standards of
proficiency on their employees, as a part of their business model to distinguish themselves from their
competitors. This approach could be encouraged by regulators requiring that advisors disclose in their
account-opening document the financial advisor’s education and qualifications. This should also be
supplemented with information about the advisor’s experience in the industry as that also has an impact
on the quality of advice that is offered to clients.
Regulators could also consider mandating disclosure of proven complaints of unsuitability or other
abusive sales practices to new clients at the time of account opening and also to existing clients by
requiring publication in hard copy and/or on the advisor’s website. It should be noted that the IDA
maintains on its website, with free access by the public, a history of any registrant and firm from 1997
onwards, including a complete record of hearings and particulars, the findings, the reasons and the
penalty. However, this places the onus on a client to seek out such information. The possibility of
negative publicity by requiring specific disclosure of proven complaints to clients may act as a stronger
disincentive against acting inappropriately in the first place. To ensure that the advisor does not minimize
the effect of this recommendation by presenting and explaining away the relevant complaints in a certain
way to clients, it would be useful to standardize what information must be conveyed to the client and the
format in which it must be presented.
In conjunction with the recommendations above, regulators could also consider a more direct approach
and impose heightened proficiency requirements and professionalism standards that currently required, to
imbue a greater sense of professionalism in the industry. It should be noted that heightened regulatory
standards for individual proficiency would be in sharp contrast to the one-time proposed B.C. model of
registration, which would have focused only on firm-level registration and left the competencies of
individuals to the firms to address on their own. Higher regulatory standards of proficiency may also be
difficult to justify on the basis that the increased cost of compliance with the heightened requirements will
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be borne by all individuals whereas the data shows that the complaints of unsuitability are rather
localized, as noted in the next section.
Recommendation #6: Firms should be encouraged to impose higher standards of proficiency on
their employees than those currently required by regulators, as a part of their business model to
distinguish themselves from their competitors.
Recommendation #7: Regulators should also consider imposing heightened proficiency
requirements and professionalism standards that currently required, to imbue a greater sense of
professionalism in the industry.
Recommendation #8: Regulators should mandate disclosure of the advisor’s educational
background, qualifications and experience at the time of account opening, including any
qualifications that are above and beyond minimum regulatory requirements.
Recommendation #9: Regulators should require advisors to disclose to new and existing clients any
proven complaints of unsuitability and other abusive sales practices.
Recommendation #10: Regulators should require advisors to disclose proven claims of unsuitable
investments and other abusive sales practices to new and existing clients.
d)

Localized Complaints and the Limits of Compliance Strategies

Investor dissatisfaction with respect to sales practices appears not to be widespread across the financial
services industry. Rather, it is more isolated. Of the total 25,000 registrants supervised by the IDA,
22,805 had no complaints against them during the period October 2002 to December 2005.42 2,210
registrants were the subject of one complaint during this period, 587 were the subject of two complaints,
and 27 were the subject of 10 or more complaints. This suggests that bad practices with respect to
investor contact are somewhat localized.
Do these localized problems tend to come up with respect to sales personnel in smaller, more transitory
firms, or are they spread across the gamut of registrant firms? It is difficult to say. In general, the larger
firms have greater controls, particularly bank-owned firms. In part, this is because they have greater
42
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resources available to them to conduct compliance whereas smaller firms are constrained by their relative
size. It is likely that those firms that are in the bottom tier attract advisors who have less stellar
performance or an adverse history in terms of regulatory breaches.
While the IDA assesses each complaint on an individual basis, the worse the advisor’s track record in
terms of past complaints, previous warnings and previous discipline, the less likely that a compliance
strategy will be effective. In certain cases and at certain times, advisors need to be weeded out of the
industry as opposed to using a compliance approach, which clearly has its limits. At some point, we
should not, as a policy matter, expend resources in trying to “rehabilitate” egregious and persistent
offenders. A more appropriate policy may then be to deny them their licence to provide financial
intermediation services.
Recommendation #11: The compliance approach should not be used for persistent and egregious
offenders who continuously engage in abusive sales practices. Instead such offenders should be
removed from the industry.
e)

Sensibility of the Risk-Based Approach to On-Site Sales Compliance Examinations

Risk-based reviews by regulators in relation to on-site sales compliance examinations appear sensible, as
the costs of such reviews are then borne by those market participants who pose the greatest risk of harm
based on their previous conduct or their line of business; lesser-risk market participants can thereby avoid
the potentially onerous cost of frequent reviews. Nonetheless, we believe that risk-based reviews should
be balanced with the threat of possible random reviews on the entire regulated population. As well, we
must be confident in the risk factors and methodology used by regulators to select the firms, and
regulators need to periodically review such factors. While much attention is paid to improving the
mechanisms used to address and resolve actual investor complaints of unsuitable sales practices, we also
encourage regulators to respond to investor concerns by obtaining their input into how the risk-based
methodology is defined and what factors are considered relevant. It is noteworthy that the IDA does take
into account the frequency of suitability complaints at particular firms and/or branches in determining
which firms and branches are the targets of sales compliance audits. The OSC’s newly created Investor
Advisory Committee could be one such vehicle to provide this sort of retail investor input on matters of
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suitability and other abusive sales practices.43
We would also encourage firms to use a risk-based approach internally within their organizations to
ensure that salespeople and branch offices are meeting the baselines expected of them, and also to identify
and deal with particular salespeople and branch offices that are particularly troublesome in terms of the
issue of abusive sales practices.
Recommendation #12: Regulators should be encouraged to obtain retail investor input how the
risk-based methodology for sales compliance audits is defined and what factors are considered
relevant in determining which firms become the subject of such audits.
Recommendation #13: Firms should be encouraged to use a risk-based approach internally within
their organizations to ensure that salespeople and branch offices are meeting the baselines expected
of them, and also to identify and deal with particular salespeople and/or branch offices that are
particularly troublesome in terms of the issue of abusive sales practices.
f)

Prosecution of Unsuitable Investment Matters

As noted above, “unsuitable investments” is the most frequent complaint category filed under COMSET.
It is also one of the top four types of complaints at the IDA complaints and at the IDA investigations
department, but it is not one of the top four issues dealt with by the IDA prosecutions department.
There are many reasons for this, which may explain why there is not a linear relationship between
complaints and resulting prosecutions.
First, prosecutions are based upon available evidence and the probability of success in going forward.
Suitability matters can relate to a full spectrum of issues. Some suitability cases are stark and there may
be significant credible evidence, which can be led that will clearly demonstrate that the registrant failed in
43
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its obligations. In other cases, suitability can be measured in shades of grey. In other words, there may
not be the necessary clear and cogent evidence that would result in a hearing likely to be successful. The
result is that the matters may be resolved through informal resolution or closed with no action. In other
circumstances complaints about suitability are not in fact about suitability at all but merely reflective of
general market conditions, as discussed above.
Similarly, and as with most prosecutions, enforcement counsel may review a number of allegations that
have been investigated and use discretion as to which complaints to proceed with and which files to close.
As an example, in an extreme case, the SRO may receive multiple complaints about suitability of
investments by a single representative. It would likely be deemed unnecessary to proceed with all of the
allegations; and it may be that one or a few of them will proceed, if there is sufficient evidence to do so.
The result would be the same in terms of furthering the goals underlying public prosecutions.
In some cases, decisions about prosecuting are effectively made for the regulator. This occurs when
clients withdraw their complaints or refuse to attend as witnesses. Case law suggests that in the absence
of a client witness it is very difficult to prove a case of suitability. 44 Where witnesses are compensated,
the monetary incentive for them to provide assistance in a regulatory hearing disappears, and in many of
those circumstances the regulator is unable to proceed with the prosecution. The IDA does not have any
ability to compel third parties as witnesses in its hearings, and there have been some very significant cases
that have been frustrated by the refusal of complainants to testify. It is one of the drivers behind the
IDA’s continuing requests for some statutory powers to compel witnesses and third-party documents for
their investigations and hearings.
Another issue to consider is that the suitability of a product may vary with time. Nortel is one such
example. At one point in time, Nortel shares would have been considered low-risk and suitable as a blue
chip stock. With their continuing accounting issues and corporate governance practices, most reasonable
people would agree that Nortel is now more likely to be considered high-risk and indeed speculative, not
suitable for low-risk clients. In those types of situations, registrants and clients need to weigh how best to
resolve investments that have changed their profile over time. Indeed, many of the suitability complaints
referred that the IDA has received were in relation to Nortel. In the worst case scenario, immediately
selling a security that has suddenly lost its lustre and low-risk status may not be an option, or not
necessarily one that is in the interest of the clients. In the worst case scenario, there may be no market, as
was the case in something such as YBM Magnex and Bre-X. The fraudulent behaviour in those types of
44
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cases was not only visited on investors, but the public as a whole. Therefore, it is a suitability concern,
but not one that was foreseeable or through the actions of the advisor.
The final point is that quite often matters are initially reported or investigated as suitability matters but
turn out otherwise. During the course of investigation, evidence may be uncovered that would suggest the
matter is not a suitability matter but instead a different type of misconduct, or that there are more serious
allegations that subsume the suitability complaints. In such cases many suitability matters may in fact be
contained in the more serious allegations or it might be converted to other types of regulatory breaches
such as conduct unbecoming. Examples of this type of situation are some of the RSP asset-stripping
schemes that were initially reported as suitability but, when investigated, were situations where the
registrant has received secret commissions and participated in a criminal scheme that places it in the
realm of conduct unbecoming.
All of the examples go a long way to explaining why suitability does not result in a linear type of result in
prosecutions from complaints, case assessment and investigations. The point of this discussion is that
back-end prosecutions by the SROs are limited as a source of evidence about the success of compliancebased strategies in the context of abusive sales practices.
Recommendation #14: The IDA should be provided with statutory authority to compel third-party
witnesses to appear before it in regulatory proceedings, so as to enhance the effectiveness of its
enforcement proceedings.
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5.

Case Study #2: Insider Trading

i.

Recent Regulatory History of the Insider Trading (IT) Problem

For a number of years now, insider trading has been considered to be a significant securities regulatory
problem in Canada, with action being taken on a number of fronts. Much media attention was paid to a
study undertaken in 2003 by Professor Bris of the Yale School of Management that purported to provide
empirical information to the effect that the stock markets of many countries, including Canada, exhibited
high rates of insider trading45. More recently, Tom Atkinson, the CEO of RS, has asserted that the
“Canadian securities industry ranks insider trading as one of the top risks to market integrity in terms of
likelihood, trend and impact”. At the regulatory level, the CSA formed an Insider Trading Task Force
(ITTF) in September 2002 that made a large number of recommendations for action on this front46. In
September 2004, the Criminal Code was amended to introduce a specific offence of insider trading, in
addition to the quasi-criminal prohibitions already existing in most provincial securities legislation47. This
legislative expansion coincided with the further development of the IMETS enforcement strategy48.
Meanwhile, insider trading has also become a significant target of enforcement action by provincial
securities commissions. Data from a study of the exercise of public interest enforcement powers for 20002003 period, conducted in 2003 by one of the co-authors, shows some priority accorded to the problem of
failure to file insider trading reports in a number of provinces, such as British Columbia, Quebec, and to a
lesser extent, Ontario49. Since that time, the attention paid to insider trading by the OSC in particular has
continued to increase, as evidenced by its use of both its OSA s.12750 and quasi-criminal powers51 to
address the problem. Thus, insider trading represents something of a high-water mark for a deterrencebased approach to regulatory efforts to control an undesirable market practice. Finally, RS has also
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devoted considerable resources to the enterprise of real-time market surveillance of trading so as to
increase regulatory capacity to identify incidents of insider trading52.
ii.

Current Compliance-Based Approaches to Insider Trading

It cannot be denied that the regulatory response to the problem of insider trading has important proactive
or compliance-based components. Such strategies include:
·

Insider reporting rules under provincial securities acts such as OSA s.107. These are generally
considered to have the dual function of (i) alerting investors about trading by insiders (assumed to
be valuable information in itself) and (ii) deterring insider trading on the basis of material
undisclosed information. 53 Canadian insider reporting rules are considered by some large issuers
to be more onerous than their counterpart rules in the U.S., with respect to the number and type of
insider captured by them, and the need for assessments by corporate secretaries as to whether
insiders are exempting themselves appropriately from the scope of the rules.

·

The exhortation to issuers in CSA NP 51-201 to adopt a series of disclosure best practices,
including the development of an insider trading policy “that provides for a senior officer to
approve and monitor the trading activity of all your insiders, officers, and senior employees”.
This policy should prohibit trading while in possession of material non-public information. The
policy further recommends observing “blackout periods” when trading may typically not take
place, especially surrounding “regularly scheduled earnings announcements54”. A compliance
review undertaken by the OSC’s corporate disclosure team in 2002 canvassed the proportion of
reviewed issuers that had “blackout policies”, and discovered that a high percentage did55. This
review does not appear to have been repeated more recently.

·

Some recent OSC settlements have included the requirement that the respondent implement an
insider trading and reporting policy56. The OSC has also granted exemptive relief from the insider
reporting requirements on the basis that the reporting issuer (RI) has a “blackout period” policy57.
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·

OSC Policy 33-60158 directed to registrants with respect to containment of inside information.
This policy advocates that registrants “consider establishing written policies and procedures in the
following areas: (a) education of employees; (b) containment of inside information; (c) restriction
of transactions; and (d) compliance59”. With respect to the latter, it is suggested that registrants
should: (i) monitor and review trading for the registrant’s account; (ii) monitor and/or restrict
trading in securities of issuers about which the registrant or its employees possess or may possess
inside information; (iii) monitor, review and/or restrict trading of all employees and in particular,
those who might be in the normal course in receipt of inside information; (iv) require a senior
officer to be responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the policies and procedures;
and (v) institute a periodic review of the adequacy or these procedures, “including a written report
on their effectiveness to senior officers or the board of directors60”. CSA staff undertook a
National Compliance Review of advising issuers in 2001. This reported that ten out of the
fourteen issuers reviewed had deficient procedures relating to personal trading practices such as
insider trading or front running. In these issuers blackout periods were found to be non-existent or
inadequate61. It should be noted that, as part of the regulatory response to the recommendations of
the ITTF, OSC Policy 33-601 is currently under active consideration by Canadian securities
regulators for reformulation into a National Instrument.

·

Role of SROs in compliance. The IDA reviews member practices with respect to so-called grey
and restricted lists and information barriers as part of its sales compliance process. As part of its
trade-desk compliance function, RS reviews trading by dealers to attempt to ensure that no insider
trading is occurring. It also operates a market surveillance function to identify unusual trading
patterns that may signal trading on the basis of undisclosed material information62.

iii.

What Do We Know About the Scope of the IT Problem?

The ITTF notes the “public perception that illegal insider trading is prevalent and increasing on Canadian
markets63”, though it also admits that “it is currently very difficult to establish accurately the extent of
insider trading, much less illegal insider trading, that occurs on Canadian markets64”. Bris’ research
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suggests that insider trading is often linked to merger announcements65. However, other enforcement
matters pursued by regulators link insider trading to disclosure of periodic or timely information by
issuers, or alternatively, delays in reporting negative information66. The ITTF also noted that insider
trading may occur in the context of “bought deals”, especially from parties solicited about participation in
the deal who do not ultimately take part.67
There is a further dearth of systemic information available about how compliance-type policies like the
containment of information or the application of “blackout” periods are actually working in the context of
issuers or registrant firms. Anecdotally, however, cases like Rankin suggest that there are shortcomings68.
iv.

Is the Current Mix of Strategies Appropriate?

Despite the relative lack of hard information about how widespread the problem of insider trading is in
Canada, as we have suggested above, there is a view among regulators and investors that the presence of
insider trading damages the reputation of the market in general, harms investors, and may increase the
cost of raising capital. The introduction of the new Criminal Code offence and the increase in
enforcement sanctioning action appear to represent a heightened commitment to deterrence of insider
trading. The recommendations of the ITTF report itself pursued the same strategy69. Indeed, one of the
commentators at the enforcement roundtable sponsored by the Task Force and CMI in February 2006 saw
the core of the problem in Canada as being that not enough insider traders do the “perp walk”, as
witnessed in the U.S70. The question raised by this research study is whether that approach is an adequate
response, or whether there is an expanded role that may be played by compliance-type strategies in
controlling the problem.
We argue that a focus on prosecution and deterrence may be an inadequate response for a variety of
reasons. It is a systemic problem of prosecutorial strategies that they take significant time to achieve a
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result, so that the effect of a prosecutorial sanction of market actors may be diluted by the passage of
time. Not all market participants will know that a result has been achieved or be aware of the details.
There is also some suggestion that the effects of punitive sanctions on general market behaviour are
transient, and may not ground long-term changes in behaviour. Punitive sanctions may also be less
effective where organizational incentives operate at odds with legal or normative requirements.
Thus, the insider trading issue presents in stark relief the ongoing dilemma of whether regulatory
enforcement efforts should be properly directed at an organization or those individuals employed by
them71. In a variety of economic and social regulatory arenas, emphasis has been increasingly placed on
whether organizations have appropriate monitoring systems in place, as opposed to a focus on punishing
the lone “bad actor72”. This is in part a response to the recognition that regulators (including securities
markets regulators) cannot deal themselves with every regulatory problem singlehandedly, and therefore
need to enrol organizations in the regulatory task as well. On the other hand, it may be argued that insider
trading is precisely one of those behaviours that is engaged in by lone individuals, motivated primarily by
personal gain rather than any misguided attempt to benefit the organization in which they are employed.
The recent Rankin decision in Ontario exemplifies the tension here, in that the decision included adverse
comment on the procedures of the M&A department of the investment bank as well as about the character
of the principal actors73 involved in the illegal activity. Ultimately, we would argue that individuals are
embedded in organizations. Those organizations might be legitimately expected to communicate
expectations, and monitor conformity with those expectations, as part of the responsibilities they
undertake in return for access to the capital markets. While organizations cannot be expected to
completely control the activities of their employees who are determined to evade legal requirements by
subterfuge, there are steps that can and should be taken to limit the possibilities for illegal trading activity
to take place and thereby reduce risk to the organization itself.
If our argument is persuasive, it suggests that there are at least two dimensions to the problem of insider
trading: (A) assuming that greater focus should be directed at organizations, whether those organizations
71
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should be subjected to greater regulatory pressure to have internal policies directed to the prohibition and
surveillance of insider trading, and (B) whether there are policy recommendations that could be made
about how to promote compliance with these policies by individuals within firms.
a)

Broadening Requirements on Issuers to Maintain Insider Trading and Reporting Policies

The ITTF recommendations on prevention included the dissemination of an information package to
officers and directors of issuers on receipt of their filing of a Form 4B with an exchange or provincial
securities commission. This information package was to include “responsibilities and guidelines
applicable to information containment, timely disclosure and insider trading restrictions, as well as
background on the underlying market integrity standards and potential sanctions74”. However, the issue to
be addressed in this section is whether the regulatory rules should go further, so as to mandate an issuer’s
development of insider trading policies, especially the reliance on “blackout periods”.
One possibility for accomplishing this would be to require the existence of such a policy to be disclosed
as an item in a reporting issuer’s AIF, or a prospectus pursuant to an IPO. AIFs are set to assume even
greater significance with the broadening of the short-form prospectus (SFP) process to encompass most
issuers. Venture issuers do not need to file AIFs under NI 51-102, but would be required to do so if they
wished to access the SFP option. Under our proposal, junior issuers would also be required to have an
insider reporting and trading policy if they used a long-form prospectus to accomplish a financing. This
proposal would assist with the transparency of information about insider trading policies that is necessary
to create a “culture of compliance” in this area. It would signal to issuers the significance in which
regulators held the problem, and it would be an efficient mechanism for supporting regulatory monitoring
of the existence of such policies, since review of the existence and content of an insider trading policy
would be part of a more holistic prospectus/AIF review process. Another effect of introducing this
requirement would be to allow the issuer an opportunity to signal its commitment to reducing IT at an
organizational level. Finally, we note that an RI insider trading policy is a mandatory requirement under
U.S. securities law.
Meanwhile, NI 58-10175, dealing with disclosure of corporate governance practices, and promulgated by
the CSA in June 2005, contains the requirement that reporting issuers disclose, either in a management
information circular or an AIF, “whether or not the board has adopted a written code [of ethical business
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conduct] for the directors, officers and employees”. The policy accompanying NI 58-101 indicates that
the code of business conduct and ethics should address a number of issues, including “confidentiality of
corporate information”, as well as “compliance with laws, rules and regulations” and “reporting of any
illegal or unethical behaviour”. To the extent that the introduction of this instrument will have the effect
of fostering a greater attention among reporting issuers to the issue of insider trading specifically, it is of
course a welcome development. We would propose however that insider trading is a sufficiently
significant concern that it would be preferable to impose a requirement for reporting issuers to explicitly
address this matter in their filings, whether this be accomplished by an amendment to NI 58-101 or to NI
51-102, dealing with the general content of an AIF.
Recommendation #15: Regulators should mandate that all reporting issuers develop and file an
explicit code of conduct dealing with prohibitions on insider trading and insider reporting policies.
Should the content of an issuer’s insider trading policy be mandated by regulators? In any event, what
might the elements of such a policy be? In general, it is likely that the issuer can evaluate best where it is
most vulnerable to compliance failures with respect to its IT policy. Thus, for a mining company it might
be around the system for internal dissemination of drilling results, whereas for a registrant it might have
to do with procedures for allocating staff to work on specific transactions. As the ITTF report indicates,
some guidance is available from the IDA’s initiative to draft a set of best practices for information
containment based on OSC 33-601, as well as from a set of best practices drafted by a group of
Vancouver investment dealers with respect to private placements specifically76. While it is likely that
most RI policies dealing with insider trading would adopt a “blackout period” approach which would
prevent RI securities being traded by insiders during specifically sensitive periods, such as prior to
earnings releases, it must be cautioned that such an approach does not help a great deal with ad hoc
material change-based disclosure, because of the unpredictability of knowing in advance what the
appropriate period would be.
With respect to such ad hoc material changes, the ITTF recommended that there be an enforceable
obligation to inform RS in a timely manner, at RS’s request, about the possibility of material events
occurring. The purpose here is to assist in RS’s surveillance activities. This proposal should be
distinguished from a pre-notification requirement, which would involve the RI providing advance notice
to RS that it was about to make a material change disclosure, or alternatively providing RS with a copy of
a confidential material change report being filed with securities regulators, so as to enhance RS’s ability
76
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to monitor trading in that RI’s securities. We understand that the TSX is considering amending its timely
disclosure policy to include a requirement for RIs to copy RS on any filing of a confidential material
change report. Meanwhile, the ITTF’s proposal may rather be dubbed a pre-pre-notification requirement,
it that it suggests notification to RS before a material change has completely crystallized. If issuers fail to
cooperate with a request for information from RS about potential material changes, this may well stem
from a fear of losing control over the timing and content of their disclosure processes. However
cooperation with regulators’ request for information must be considered a core element of ethical market
behaviour by RIs.
An even broader possibility is the introduction of an obligation to inform RS about potential material
changes, even in the absence of a request for information from the regulator itself. A potential problem
here is the possibility that RS would be inundated with material about future RI material changes, which
may not in fact ultimately come to fruition. We suggest, therefore, that such a routine pre-pre-notification
requirement should not be made mandatory at this point, but that RIs should be encouraged to make best
efforts to engage in a practice of notifying RS in advance about potential material changes, even in the
absence of a request from the regulator and once a reasonable threshold of the likelihood of their
occurring had been reached.
Recommendation #16: The content of an IT policy should not be mandated by regulators, though it
most likely should include the introduction of routine “blackout periods”. It should also provide
some indication of how the issuer proposes to monitor ongoing adherence to its internal policy.
Recommendation #17: RIs should be encouraged to include, as an element of their IT policy, an
undertaking to make best efforts to inform RS of potential material changes that are reasonably
likely to occur.
b)

Supporting Enhanced Compliance with Internal Policies

Knowledge of Requirements
The OECD’s regulatory compliance report noted that “Studies in both Hong Kong and Australia show
that few company directors have a sound, or even basic, understanding of their obligations under
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companies and securities regulation77”. Similar studies have not been undertaken in Canada, and highprofile media attention has been directed to the question of insider trading. Nonetheless, it is still possible
that those who would be designated as being in “a special relationship with the reporting issuer78” and
therefore susceptible to the insider trading prohibition may be unaware of the nature and scope of the
prohibition. An IOSCO report on the need for educating market participants about unacceptability of the
practice of insider trading was endorsed by the CSA in its ITTF report79. While the broad outlines of the
prohibition are straightforward, there is some complexity attached to the assessment of when the
information in the possession of someone in a special relationship is sufficiently “material” to be
disclosed, or in any event to prevent the insider trading80. Although there are pervasive rule design issues
with respect to the slippage between the definition of a “material fact” and a “material change” in most
Canadian securities legislation81, we would argue that it is primarily the role of organizations to apprise
their officers and employees of these requirements and to assist them with cognitive appreciation of the
nuances of when and how the requirements apply. However the ITTF reviewed the compliance manuals
of “several major Canadian investment dealers” and found only one that included guidance for employees
on best practices for information containment. This is despite the fact that OSC Policy 33-601 has been in
place since 1998.
Recommendation #18: Issuers and registrants should better educate their officers and employees
about the parameters of insider trading, such as when information is sufficiently “material” to
trigger the insider trading prohibitions. Issuers should also engage seriously in an ethics building
process with respect to insider trading.
Organizational Monitoring of Compliance with Internal Policies
Assuming that issuers and registrants comply (if they have not already) with a requirement to establish an
insider trading policy that clearly establishes insider trading as a prohibited activity, how much should
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issuers be expected to monitor the trading activity of their officers or employees on an ongoing basis82?
Issuers might well argue that it is simply too difficult to monitor actual compliance with internal policies
around insider trading, given the incentives for individuals to conceal their activity. This seems like a less
than satisfactory response given the public concern about the practice. A better approach might start with
the acknowledgement that the existence of a practice of insider trading within an issuer firm poses
significant risk for that issuer, not just of regulatory sanction but of reputational damage as well. On the
other hand, given the concerns expressed about insider trading by investors, issuers that became known as
“compliance leaders”83 in this area might be expected to reap reputational rewards.
Consideration of the issue of monitoring by issuer firms for compliance with insider trading policies
should distinguish between the situation of issuers and registrants. Issuer firms will be concerned with
monitoring trading by their officers and employees in the issuer’s own securities. Registrant firms will
have a broader ambit of concern, given the scope of the information about RIs generally that might be
available to those whose activities they are concerned about. In both cases, however, Langevoort’s
observation that internal supervision mechanisms may take the form of either aggressive monitoring or
ethics building is illuminating. He notes that the difficulty with aggressive monitoring might be that it
stimulates mistrust of the firm among employees, i.e. there will be “lower rates of compliance as a result
of turning up the heat84”. Thus firms might be likely to choose “compliance structures in which the values
of motivation and cohesion (not to mention worries about out-of-pocket costs) often trump high-powered
monitoring, thus opting for higher compliance risk because it is the most sensible strategy”85. This
suggests that it is incumbent on firms at least to engage seriously in an ethics building process with
respect to insider trading, with the possibility of more aggressive monitoring being instituted later.
Yet, a further aspect of this issue, as it relates to RIs, involves the controversial matter of the forms of
compensation provided to an issuer’s senior officers or directors, since often the vehicle for insider
trading is awarding or cashing in stock options86. It is a truism to say that if compensation were less
frequently given in the form of issuer securities, there would be less opportunity for insider trading and
less of a need for RIs to engage in monitoring the trading activities of their employees. At the least,
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rigorously allocating responsibility to a designated officer within a firm to monitor the exercise of stock
options would be a significant component of a firm-based strategy for preventing insider trading. This
should, in our view, encompass a requirement not to exercise stock options without the written approval
of the designated monitor, and verification by the exerciser of the options that he or she has no knowledge
of material undisclosed information.
In this respect, it should be noted that s. 613(j) of the TSX ‘s Company Manual indicates that
“listed issuers may not set option exercise prices, or prices at which securities may
otherwise be acquired, on the basis of market prices which do not reflect material
information of which management is aware but which has not been disclosed to the
public”
In October 2005 the TSX issued a notice reminding listed issuers of these provisions, and indicating that
the TSX “will not permit options to be granted” if material information has not been disclosed. The notice
also “cautions listed issuers about granting options during a blackout period”87, and indicates that the TSX
will be prepared to mobilize the sanctions available to it (requiring options to be cancelled, forfeited or
repriced, or issuer suspension or delisting) where options have been granted while material information is
undisclosed.
Recommendation #19: Issuers should give serious consideration to developing ongoing monitoring
capabilities in the area of insider trading, especially with respect to the granting or exercise of stock
options. This could include the appointment of a senior officer with responsibility for approving the
exercise of stock options.
Technological Innovation and the Role of RS
It is clear that the ability to use technological tools to monitor the identity and activity of traders in
reporting issuer securities is a crucial complement to efforts by issuers to monitor the activities of their
own staff or members. Technological surveillance strategies can be embedded in the activity of trading
itself, for example by the ability to discern unusual trading patterns in a security where public
announcements have been made or are imminent. In this sense the integrity of the regulation of insider
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trading is highly dependent on the surveillance and analysis activities of RS. We have discussed above the
recommendation of the ITTF that issuers be required to provide additional support for RS’s efforts by
introducing an enforceable obligation on them to provide RS with advance notice of material events, to
facilitate RS’s monitoring activities.
In addition to such developments, we suggest that RS disseminate more broadly, information about the
sensitivity and reach of its technological capacity for detection of incidents of insider trading, as a
potential deterrent to those who might be otherwise tempted to engage in the activity. We would also
support putting resources into investigating whether the role of technology in this area could be enhanced
by a greater ability for trading platforms to block altogether transactions that might be suggestive of
insider trading taking place, such as the purchase or sale of securities with limit prices significantly
outside of recent trade ranges for that security. We have noted already the analogy applicable in the short
selling case, whereby the trading platform will not allow the entering of a short sale order on a down tick,
as such a short sale is prohibited under UMIRs rules. In this regard, it is important to point out that
markers designating trades as insider trades must be provided by dealers to RS, though these are not
disclosed publicly. Indeed, the ITTF had recommended that such insider trading markers be publicly
disclosed in real time. The existence of the requirement of disclosure to RS does not, of course, prevent
insider traders from evading it, for example by having the trades originate from the accounts of
cooperative non-insiders or from offshore. In this respect, RS is heavily reliant on monitoring engaged in
by IDA members conducting trades on behalf of clients. In accordance with a recommendation of the
ITTF, RS and the IDA have developed a set of “insider trading red flags”, which were promulgated to
members in November 200588.
Meanwhile, we endorse the recommendation about real time disclosure of legal insider trading made by
the ITTF 89. As well as providing more useful, time-sensitive information to investors generally, this
innovation would serve to signal to insider traders the importance regulators accorded to the disclosure
and monitoring of their trading activities.
Recommendation #20: Additional regulatory resources should be devoted to the enhancement of
technological tools for detecting or preventing insider trading activities.
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Recommendation #21: Insider trading should be disclosed publicly in real time, as a further
deterrent to illegal insider trading and to enhance the market information available to retail
investors.
The Role of the Regulator
Securities commissions are heavily dependent on the detection abilities of RS to obtain information about
potential infractions of the IT prohibition that they may proceed to investigate. The issue for us is whether
there is a role for public regulators to play in attempting to prevent the practice in the first place. Given
the general popularity of risk-based assessment in the regulatory enterprise, it would not be surprising to
argue for such a strategy in terms of how public regulators handle the issue of insider trading. With
respect to issuers, for example, it seems plausible that SMEs might be a greater source of risk of insider
trading practices for a variety of reasons, not least of which are their likely greater difficulty in educating
their employees about the prohibition, and their greater likelihood of compensating by way of stock
options. We argue that regulators should concentrate some compliance resources with respect to IT on
ensuring that SMEs in fact introduce appropriate internal IT policies and have an internal strategy for
monitoring its effectiveness.
More generally, regulators have a useful role to play in building issuer capacities to monitor or educate
their employees about legal requirements90. They are also the best entity to engage in measurement of
compliance rates and monitoring of how preventive strategies are working across the issuer and registrant
community. In the IT context, this would involve commissions gathering data at two levels: identifying
who has introduced insider trading policies, and analysis of RS trading data to see if any patterns emerge
with respect to the characteristics of the high-risk actors or institutions engaging in IT.
Recommendation #22: Regulators should adopt a risk-based approach to monitoring and
surveilling RIs for compliance with enhanced insider trading requirements.
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6.

Case Study #3: Primary Market Disclosure

i.

Introduction

Businesses have the ability to access significant pools of capital through the public markets in Canada.
In 2005, a total of $42.16 billion was raised through 436 transactions in the Canadian capital markets.
IPO activity accounted for 139 deals with a value of $15.97 billion while public issuers making
subsequent offerings accounted for the other 297 deals with a value of $26.19 billion. 91
The raising of capital in the public markets is of critical concern to securities regulators in Canada. The
prospectus has historically been considered the fundamental securities document in the issuance process
and has been the focus of much of regulatory attention. Some would say that there has been too much
focus on primary market disclosure, including the past Chair of the OSC: “Historically, in matters of
corporate finance, securities law and regulatory practice has been pre-occupied with the qualification of
new issues under the prospectus system, with far too little focus on maintaining a current record of quality
information about an issuer”.92
Continuous disclosure is the subject of the following case study. The purpose of this case study is to
explore the compliance tools and strategies used in the context of the primary market disclosure and to
assess their effectiveness. This case study considers the impact of developments such as: the move away
from the use of the long-form prospectus to the short-form prospectus and other more streamlined
prospectuses; and the market shift away from the primary market to the secondary market (90% of all
securities transactions take place in the secondary market)93 and the related regulatory focus on
continuous disclosure and an integrated disclosure system.
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billion in 72 IPO transactions involving preferred shares and structured products.
· Income Trusts: $18.73 billion in 165 transactions. IPO activity accounts for $5.34 billion in 43 IPO
transactions involving income trusts.
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ii.

Strategies for Ensuring Full, True and Plain Disclosure of All Material Information in the
Prospectus

The prospectus is required for IPOs, other primary offerings of securities and in some cases, secondary
offerings. The prospectus contains mandated disclosure of information and attempts to reduce
information asymmetries as between issuers and investors. It also serves as a useful tool to assist market
participants to price securities accurately. Securities laws require that the prospectus must provide full,
true and plain disclosure of all material facts. What policy tools and strategies are currently employed to
ensure that issuers, do, in fact, provide full, true and plain disclosure in the prospectus? We list several
significant ones below.
Securities Laws, Regulations and Policies:
·

To give some meaning to the phrase full, true and plain disclosure, securities law rules set out
requirements for specific information that must be contained in all prospectuses. 94

·

Securities law rules also impose specific requirements for prospectus disclosure for certain types
of issuers and/or securities. 95

·

The CSA also issues guidance on their expectations in relation to prospectus disclosure for certain
types of securities, most recently in relation to income trusts.96

Certification by Senior Management and Directors:
·

The prospectus must be certified by the CEO, the CFO and any two directors of the issuer that the
prospectus constitutes full, true and plain disclosure of all material facts.

Gatekeeper Involvement and Certification:
·

Underwriters: The underwriter(s) must also certify that to the best of its knowledge, information
and belief, the prospectus contains full, true and plain disclosure of all material facts.

·

Auditors: The auditor must certify that the issuer’s financial statements have been prepared in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.

·

Lawyers: While lawyers are not required to certify the prospectus, their involvement conceivably
imposes additional discipline on the issuer.
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See, for example, OSC Rule 41-501, General Prospectus Requirements (2000), 23 OSCD (Supp.)).
See for example, National Instrument 41-502 Prospectus Requirements for Mutual Funds.
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For example, see CSA Staff Notice 41-304 - Income Trusts: Prospectus Disclosure of Distributable Cash (August
2005); See also the National Policy 41-201 Income Trusts and Other Indirect Offerings.
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Regulatory Vetting of Preliminary Prospectus:
·

Securities regulators have the opportunity to vet a preliminary prospectus during the waiting
period, which is the period between when the receipt is issued for a preliminary prospectus and
when the receipt is issued for a final prospectus.

·

The Director can refuse to issue a receipt for a final prospectus if the director determines that the
prospectus contains a statement, promise, estimate or forecast that is misleading, false, or
deceptive. The Director also has discretion to refuse to issue a receipt if the proceeds of the sale
are insufficient to achieve the intended purpose.97

Public Sanctions:
·

Securities laws create an offence for failure to file a prospectus and also failure to deliver a
prospectus without the regulator having issued a receipt for the prospectus.

·

Securities regulators can cease trade or cancel or restrict a party’s registration for failure to
comply with the prospectus requirements.

·

Some provincial regulators have the authority to order the person in violation of the prospectus
requirements to resign or be prohibited to act as a director or officer.

Investor Remedies:
·

A remedy of rescission for misrepresentation in a prospectus and/or a right of action for damages
is also available to investors.

We now analyze the effectiveness of some of these strategies or approaches.
Securities Laws, Regulations and Policies
In the context of particular securities law rules that relate to primary market disclosure, our first
observation and recommendation relates to the definition of material fact. The requirement that the
prospectus contain full, true and plain disclosure of all material facts is critical to securities regulation.
Currently, the definition of material fact differs across provincial securities legislation, with some
provincial acts containing a forward-looking provision and others containing a forward- and backwardlooking component. The Quebec Securities Act requires disclosure of all material facts that are likely to
97

See OSC s.61, for example. See also Loki Resources Ltd. (1984) where the OSC refused to issue a receipt. See
also Tricor Holdings (1981) where the director refused to issue a receipt for an issuer which had previously been
controlled by an individual with a serious criminal record.
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affect value or market price of the security, without a qualifier or threshold of “significance” as in the
other acts. We recommend that a uniform definition of “material fact” be adopted across the country in
the interests of ensuring compliance with the prospectus requirements.
Our second observation and recommendation relates to the distinction between material fact and material
change. Securities acts require disclosure of any material change after a receipt has been issued for the
final prospectus but before the distribution is complete. This issue was significant in the Danier case
where the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed that the obligation to amend a prospectus relates only to
material changes and not to material facts.98 To the extent that technical distinctions can be drawn
between these two terms, allowing issuers to withhold material information during the primary issuance
process, we urge the Task Force to consider ways in which this definitional loophole may be closed.
Finally, our review of a sample of prospectuses filed in 2005 asks us to question whether there is
compliance with the requirement that the prospectus contains “plain” disclosure of all material facts. Our
review found technical, boilerplate language that would be difficult for many unsophisticated investors to
comprehend. We fully endorse the other research studies commissioned by the Task Force, which
recommend that disclosure documents be simplified and written in plain English.
Recommendation #23: A uniform definition of material fact should be adopted across the country
in the interests of ensuring compliance with the prospectus requirements. The distinction between
material fact and material change should be eliminated.
Regulatory Vetting by Securities Regulators
The waiting period provides an opportunity for regulators to review the prospectus and determine whether
it complies with securities laws requirements. However, not all prospectuses that are filed are reviewed by
securities regulators.
There are several possible levels of review. Using the typology in the OSC’s 2005 Corporate Finance
Annual Report, there is first the Screening Review during which senior lawyers and accountants screen
prospectuses to determine whether the prospectus should be subject to a Full Review, Issue-Oriented
Review or Basic Review. A Basic Review is largely limited to an administrative processing of the

98

The Supreme Court of Canada recently granted leave to appeal in the Danier case.
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document. A Full Review involves a complete review of the prospectus and any documents incorporated
by reference. An Issue Oriented Review focuses on specific legal, accounting or other regulatory issues.
In fiscal year 2005, the OSC engaged in 300 Basic Reviews, 121 Full Reviews and 66 Issue-Oriented
Reviews, for a total of 487 reviews. (These numbers are not significantly different than the breakdown
from previous years.) Of the 187 Full or Issue-Oriented Reviews, 101 involved long-form prospectuses,
71 involved short-form prospectuses and 15 involved rights offerings circulars.
Excluding the 300 Basic Reviews of prospectuses, the prospectuses reviewed by Corporate Finance
accounted for approximately 36% of all prospectuses filed in Ontario.99 The reviews also represented 29%
of all issuers whose head office is located in Ontario, and for which Ontario would likely be the principal
regulator under MRRS. 67% of the issuers reviewed under Full or Issue-Oriented Review were listed on
the TSX.
Given the existence of multiple securities regulators and the existence of the MRRS, we suggest that
securities regulators adopt a policy that they will engage only in a Full Review or an Issue-Oriented
Review of those issuers’ prospectuses for which they are the principal regulator under MRRS. They
should engage in a Basic Review for all other issuers, leaving the possibility of a more rigorous review by
the principal regulator.
It appears as though, based on the OSC’s data, the OSC has engaged in Full or Issue-Oriented Review
generally only of issuers who have the OSC as their principal regulator. We do not have data from the
other commissions on this point, but we encourage this approach by all the regulators, on the basis of
efficiency and best use of limited resources.
The OSC Corporate Finance report states that prospectuses relating to IPOs receive full review as do
those that score high on their risk-based profile. The OSC’s Staff Notice 11-719 outlines its risk-based
approach to prospectus review. It states that “the objective of the selective review system is to focus
limited staff resources on material and relevant issues, thereby facilitating an effective and cost-effective
review process”. The prospectus review criteria used by OSC staff, as set out in OSC Staff Notice 11-719,
relate to risks under four categories: Issuer’s Corporate Structure and Underlying Business; Issuer’s
Financial Conditions or Results; Nature of Offering; and Matters Related to Advisors or Corporate
Governance.
99
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It used to be that the short-form prospectus allowed for a streamlined primary issuance process for
seasoned issuers who had a significant public disclosure record and large market capitalization. The
theory was that investors would be protected because of market scrutiny of the public disclosure record as
well as securities regulators’ prior vetting of the continuous disclosures. However, NI 44-101 now allows
a broader range of public issuers to access the short-form prospectus by having done away with the
seasoning and market capitalization requirements.
To the extent that that streamlined prospectuses are less likely to receive a Full Review, we are relying
heavily on the efficacy of market- and law-based strategies that ensure accurate and timely continuous
disclosures. However, in light of the changes to the short-form prospectus rules, we question whether the
market mechanisms (i.e. research analysts) that assist in scrutinizing and verifying the pubic disclosures
of larger, more-seasoned public issuers are as effective in the context of smaller, less-seasoned public
issuers. This should put more pressure on the securities regulators to engage in a vetting of short-form
disclosure documents that are filed by smaller, less-seasoned issuers.
As well, the waiting period for the short-form prospectus is generally much shorter than for the long-form
prospectus. National Policy 43-201 (1999), 22 OSCB 7308 requires the principal regulator under MRRS
to use its best efforts to issue a comment letter on the preliminary short-form prospectus within three
working days after the issuance of the preliminary MRRS decision document (receipt). Non-principal
regulators are supposed to communicate their comments by noon on the working day after the principal
regulator releases its comments. Even if the principal regulator engages in a Full or Issue-Oriented
Review, the depth of the review possible in three days is limited.
Recommendation #24: Regulators should engage in full or targeted review of only those
prospectuses for which they are the issuer’s principal regulator under MRRS, so as to expend their
resources efficiently and avoid duplicative review.
Gatekeepers
The involvement of gatekeepers such as underwriters and auditors is viewed, overall, as adding integrity
to the public issuance process. The underwriter’s involvement in developing the offering and drafting the
preliminary prospectus with the issuer (together with liability for same) should give public investors a
greater level of confidence that the prospectus contains full, true and plain disclosure. As was stated in the
decision in YBM, an underwriter is a “gatekeeper of the public interest with professional expertise in the
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capital markets….An underwriter must go beyond the statements of the issuer’s directors, officers and
counsel and must avoid automatic reliance”. 100 The decision continues by stating: “An underwriter must
challenge the disclosure the issuer proposes to make to the investing public….Lead underwriters must be
adversarial”.101 Similarly, the requirement for audited financial statements should allow investors a
heightened degree of comfort in the financial health of the company as reflected by the financial
statements.
While private gatekeepers can provide assurances to investors, they also face significant conflicts of
interest.102 Some conflicts are left to market forces to sort out; others are addressed by securities
regulators directly through bright-line prohibitions or other rule design. In the context of underwriting, for
example, provincial securities regulators have created National Instrument 33-105, Underwriting
Conflicts (2001), 24 OSCB 7687 and the IDA has promulgated Policy 11 on research analysts. Similarly,
in the context of financial disclosure and the role of auditors, recent securities regulatory reform has
focused on, amongst other things, independence requirements for auditors, the composition of the audit
committee and its relationship to the auditors, and the creation of CPAB - an oversight body that inspects
accounting firms that audit public companies.
In this study, we do not analyze in any detail into how the gatekeeping functions of underwriters, auditors
and others may be improved because we understand that separate studies have been commissioned by the
Task Force on the topic of gatekeepers and their effectiveness. However, we do note that regulators place
significant weight on the involvement of gatekeepers in the issuance process in deciding what level of
review they should conduct on an issuer’s prospectus. For example, OSC Staff Notice 11-719 notes as a
risk factor whether the “issuer has not engaged an underwriter to perform due diligence in connection
with the offering”, which suggests that something more than a basic review of the issuer’s prospectus is
likely warranted. Similarly, in the YBM case, it was noted that OSC staff “were not prepared to issue a
receipt for a final prospectus until YBM’s income statement was confirmed by a ‘Big Six’ accounting
firm”. 103
It should be noted that underwriters are not involved in the verification of an issuer’s disclosure on a
continuous basis in the same way that they are involved in the traditional long-form prospectus process.
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To the extent that there is a move to an integrated disclosure document or a continuous market access
model which would limit or do away with the prospectus, we suggest that the Task Force consider ways
in which other tools and strategies can be strengthened to fill the void that underwriters currently play.
This might include more frequent or in-depth regulatory reviews as well as ensuring that private liability
mechanisms are adequate.
Recommendation #25: In light of the liberalization of the short-form prospectus eligibility
requirements, securities regulators should engage in more frequent and more in depth vetting of
short-form prospectuses (and continuous disclosure records) of those issuers who are not as closely
followed by market participants such as research analysts.
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7.

Case Study #4: Continuous Disclosure (CD)

i.

Recent Regulatory History of the CD Issue

Finding a regulatory approach that produces optimal levels of CD is crucial to a thriving securities
market, since as has been frequently pointed out, more than 90% of securities take place in secondary
markets as opposed to primary markets. Investors, whether individual or institutional, are much more
likely to interact with the secondary market on a consistent basis than they are with the primary market
and are therefore much more likely to have an experience-based opinion about its integrity104. There has
developed a widespread view among U.S. and Canadian regulators over the last several years that
investor opinion as to the integrity of the secondary markets was adversely affected by media and other
reports about disclosure inadequacies at U.S. companies like Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia and others.
This premise prompted the promulgation and implementation of legislative requirements such as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), and CSA rules modeled on SOX105. We summarize the constitutive
elements of this ongoing rule design effort in Canada below, bearing in mind that other research studies
sponsored by the Task Force will analyze this rule development process in detail.
Although, as with the insider trading issue, we have not yet seen in Canada high-level prosecutions
similar to those that have accompanied the financial downfall of companies like Enron or Adelphia in the
U.S.106, we have begun to see a trickle of regulatory enforcement actions in provinces like Ontario107.
Interestingly, some of these have involved the regulators requiring issuers to conduct reviews of their
disclosure requirements as part of an OSA s. 127 sanction. At the same time investors have been provided
with another avenue of legal redress for inadequate CD disclosure by issuers in the shape of the recentlyproclaimed Part XXIII.1 of the OSA. This is designed to provide a more favourable statutory liability
regime for investors suing issuers for various CD failures. Ultimately the concern of this section of our
study is an assessment of the strengths and limitations of a compliance-oriented approach to promoting
good CD practices in Canadian securities markets.
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Nor is there much dispute that CD contributes to the overall efficiency of securities markets, though there is of
course contestation about how much information is enough.
105
This perspective on the part of legislators and regulators has not gone unchallenged in the academic literature.
See Roberta Romano “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance” (2005) 114 Yale
Law Journal 1521. The issue is also being addressed by other research studies sponsored by the Task Force.
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Though these prosecutions have not necessarily targeted disclosure inadequacies.
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See decisions like YBM; Miller and Bernstein; Agnico-Eagle. The investigation currently underway into the
activities of Royal Group Technologies may provide a prosecutorial dimension to the regulatory response to CD
deficiencies.
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ii.

CD Rule Design in Canada

As indicated, much of the recent intensity of CD regulation in Canada has been located at the rule-design
level. While the statute itself has historically contained rules about continuous and timely disclosure (e.g.
OSA s.75), more recent examples of completed and incomplete rule-design efforts in this area include the
following national or multilateral rules:
·

NI 51-102: this instrument, promulgated by the CSA in 2004 harmonizes the rules relating to
types of CD material required of reporting issuers in Canada. It restates, or in some instances,
enhances provincial legislative requirements relating to material change disclosure and annual
and interim financial statement requirements, harmonizes provincial requirements with respect to
annual and interim Management, Discussion and Analysis documents (MD&A), establishes an
Annual Information Form (AIF) requirement for non-venture issuers and a Business Acquisition
Report (BAR) requirement. As we note elsewhere in this report, passage of this harmonized rule
provided the platform for extending the opportunity to file short-form prospectuses for financings
to reporting issuers generally.

·

NI 52-108: one of the so-called CanSox initiatives, this rule establishes the Canadian Public
Accountability Board (CPAB), which enters into participation agreements with accounting firms
before they may be engaged to provide audit services to reporting issuers, and which monitors the
“quality-control systems” of these firms.

·

MI 52-109: this provision requires annual and interim certificates to be filed by CEOs and
CFOs108 of reporting issuers that certify that issuers’ annual and interim filings do not contain a
misrepresentation. The filings further certify that these individuals have established and
maintained both “disclosure controls and procedures” and “internal control over financial
reporting” to provide “reasonable assurance” concerning knowledge of material information
about the issuer and concerning the reliability of financial reporting. The effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures is also required to be evaluated109. These requirements came
into effect for financial years ending on or after March 31, 2005. Significantly, the rule does not
prescribe any specific policies and procedures that must make up either of these control
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Or their equivalents.
CSA Notice 52-313, dated March 10, 2006 indicates that the CSA proposes to expand MI 52-109 to include
certifying that an evaluation of the effectiveness of the issuer’s internal controls over financial reporting has been
undertaken, with respect to financial years ending on or after December 31, 2007.
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mechanisms, and it is quite clear about the fact that “these considerations are best left to
management’s judgement”110.
·

MI 52-110: this rule enumerates a set of responsibilities and authority for the audit committees of
reporting issuers111, and establishes financial literacy and independence criteria for members of
audit committees112.

·

Proposed MI 52-111: this proposed rule would have required that management evaluate the
effectiveness of its internal control over financial reporting “against a suitable control
framework” and have that assessment audited. In March 2006 the CSA indicated that proposed
MI 52-111, which was “substantially similar” to the requirements of the SOX Act, s.404, would
be withdrawn. This decision was the result of “extensive review and consultation and in view of
the delays and the debate underway in the U.S over the rules implementing section 404 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002113”.

·

NI 58-101: this rule requires disclosure of important aspects of the reporting issuer’s corporate
governance practices to be provided in an issuer’s AIF or management information circular114.
The rule does not prescribe what corporate governance practices would be appropriate with
respect to any of these matters, but its accompanying policy does provide guidance about
corporate governance best practices115.

The OECD’s regulatory compliance report advocates that appropriate rule-design is the first step in a
comprehensive compliance strategy. Yet there remain some opaque areas for the regulated community at
this stage of the compliance process. This is especially the case with respect to the definition of
“materiality” and the extent to which business judgment will be persuasive in this context116. To the
extent that ambiguity about the definition of a “material change” under securities law is an operating
factor in RI failures to make timely disclosure of material information, it is clearly a significant
shortcoming in the legislation. More generally, we have noted that there has been some contestation about
110
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the appropriateness of the CanSox rules introduced, with respect to the costs they impose on all issuers
and the demonstrated need for their existence, which debate has apparently resulted in the withdrawal of
proposed MI 52-111. It is outside the scope of this study to enter fully into that debate, though it is
necessary of course to acknowledge that the perceived legitimacy of the rules that market participants
have to comply with is an important factor in the achievement of robust compliance rates. Thus it has
been suggested that the importation of S-Ox regulatory requirements into Canada may encourage the
development of a “loophole-conscious, rules-based culture” to the detriment of cultures of compliance117.
iii.

Current Compliance Strategies Used with Respect to CD Requirements

a)

From Rule Design to Compliance

Observers of regulatory policy-making point out that, following an intensive period of rule design, it is
crucial to follow up by monitoring the implementation of complying practices by the regulated
community, or the credibility of regulators risks being undermined118. It is also axiomatic that it may be
problematic to proceed immediately from rule design to the imposition of serious sanctions, given the
inevitable time-delay associated with the regulated community becoming conversant with new
requirements and building organizational capacity to comply. This suggests that in many instances where
new rules are introduced, lower-visibility and less-adversarial compliance monitoring by the regulator is
the most appropriate next step. Such compliance monitoring also, of course, provides the regulator with
useful systemic information about the extent to which the regulated community is indeed complying on
the ground with existing and new rules.
b)

What Do We Know About Compliance Rates with CD Requirements?

Obviously there were robust CD requirements in place, covering annual and interim financial reporting,
AIF/MD&A disclosure and timely disclosure of material changes, before the CanSox initiatives were
introduced. Many would argue that the current emphasis on new rule design in Canada in the CD area has
not been evidence-based, in the sense that regulators have not adequately demonstrated widespread
deviation from CD-compliant practice. Some information about CD compliance levels exhibited by
reporting issuers in Ontario is available from the OSC Corporate Finance Staff’s annual reports on
continuous disclosure. OSC staff began issuing these reports in 2000, following the creation of a
117
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continuous disclosure team within that branch of the Commission. Even more recently the CSA has
begun to also issue annual reports on CD compliance issues. The evidence available from these reports is
considered in more detail below.
We also observe that the recently-published B.C. Securities Commission’s Service Plan for 2006-2009
indicates that one of the objectives of the regulator in the near term will be to determine “how pervasive
disclosure failures are among B.C.-based issuers”. 119 To determine this, the B.C. Commission plans to
apply risk-based criteria related to disclosure failures to a pilot group of the most significant B.C.-based
issuers. This pilot program is expected to create a manageable number of leads “for stepped up review by
compliance staff… If untimely disclosure is a pervasive problem, we will design outcomes-based
compliance tools to reduce the incidence of this problem among B.C. issuers”. One feature of this will be
to analyze subsequent disclosures of these issuers to demonstrate if the issuer took action in response to
the expression of regulatory concerns.
In addition, it should be noted that while it is already a challenging task for regulators to assess the
substantive adequacy of disclosure materials filed with them, it is even more challenging to assess the rate
at which RIs are failing altogether to disclose material information, either on a periodic or timely basis.
We have outlined already the OECD report’s typology of reasons for non-compliance with regulatory
requirements. In the specific context of CD disclosure requirements, lack of knowledge of the
requirements (with reference to the new CanSOX rules) may well be an operating factor. The ability to
comply might be adversely affected by the ambiguity associated with the definition of “material change”.
More generally, an RI’s willingness to comply with periodic or timely disclosure requirements may also
be influenced by internal organizational pressures to suppress or delay negative information so as to keep
the share price high, or to allow self-interested transactions to occur.
c)

Types of Compliance Strategies Currently Being Employed

Firm-Level Compliance
It appears from the 2005 Corporate Finance report of OSC Staff that an “increasing number” of issuers
have introduced formal corporate disclosure policies120. OSC staff encourages the promulgation of such
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internal policies by issuers, because of its role in “forc(ing) a critical examination of current disclosure
practices121”. However, the same report notes some shortcomings in the drafting and implementation of
those policies, with respect to the extent to which they are crafted to reflect the specific issuer’s
circumstances as opposed to being a restatement of the generalized language of NP 51-201; an
insufficiently broad membership for so-called “disclosure committees” that some issuers are establishing;
and insufficient attention paid to the detail of the controls to be established by the issuer to support the
effective working of the disclosure policy122.
From a compliance perspective, one of the central substantive goals of the new MI 52-109 is the
requirement for reporting issuers to design and certify the adequacy of internal controls over disclosure
practices and specifically financial reporting. In this sense the new rule specifically promotes the
development and documentation of a compliance orientation within reporting issuers; that is, that they
develop internal systems to ensure that their compliance with substantive disclosure and financial
reporting rules is appropriate. Thus the rule creates a requirement for issuers to more aggressively address
at the organizational level the adequacy of their disclosure123. However an equally significant aspect of
MI 52-109 is that the content of these disclosure controls is left up to issuers themselves124. The question
posed by some commentators is whether the development of these internal control systems will become a
“check-the-box” exercise, or will rather cause issuers to more radically reorient the priority they accord to
disclosure in accordance with the intent of the rule125. We take up this issue further below.
CD Compliance Strategies at the Regulatory Level
The CD review program engaged in by the OSC and the CSA collectively serves at least two purposes:
·

to closely review the CD filings of a significant subset of reporting issuers and resolve any
deficiencies found in those filings using a number of options, as described below

·

to provide notice to the regulated community generally of systemic shortcomings with respect to
specific CD issues.
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The vehicle for accomplishing the latter goal is the annual reports issued by both the Corporate Finance
branch of the OSC and annual notices promulgated by the CSA on CD issues. More detail on each of
these compliance-related functions is provided below.
Compliance Review of Reporting-Issuer CD
The CD review program was introduced by the OSC in 2000, with the goals of increasing awareness of
CD issues and effecting greater discipline in the marketplace with respect to CD requirements126. The
goal established at that time was to review RIs on average once every four years. The percentage of
issuers typically reviewed since then has ranged from a low of 19% to a high of 36% (achieved in 2004).
However, it is important to point out that the primary reason for higher rates of review appears to be that
the absolute number of reporting issuers has been dropping over the last number of years, rather than that
increased regulatory resources has allowed reviewers to increase their reach over the pool of reporting
issuers as a whole. While speculation as to the cause of this overall downward trend in the number of
reporting issuers in Canada is beyond the scope of this study, it seems important to flag it, and to suggest
that it may be a source of concern if it is responsive to heightened securities regulatory requirements.
Staff’s 2000 report indicated that it had selected issuers for review based on monitoring press articles,
complaints from the public and referrals from other OSC branches. More generally, OSC Staff Notice 11719, establishing the agency’s risk-based approach to regulation, canvasses the criteria that are likely to
drive the selection of issuers for CD review. They are as follows:
·

stock trading activity (including unusual trading patterns, or a significant stock market impact due
to market capitalization or trading volume);

·

issuer’s financial condition or results (the issuer is experiencing financial difficulty, recent
restatement of financial results, unusual fluctuations in earnings, significant lawsuit or
contingency);

·

accounting methods and practices (changes to a significant accounting policy, unusual
Canadian/U.S. G.A.A.P. reconciliation, transactions where there are divergent views as to
accounting practice);
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·

auditor-related issues (auditor’s report includes a qualified opinion or missing information,
auditor is terminated or resigns, previous experience indicates that issuer, auditor or
directors/officers warrant greater scrutiny); and

·

prior regulatory scrutiny (no recent CD scrutiny by regulator, history of prior non-compliance,
referral from another regulatory source, public complaints).

Corporate Finance staff continues to reiterate the influence of risk-based assessment in driving the review
selection process, indicating that this approach is also broadly popular among other international
securities regulators. It provides the flexibility to reorient selection factors as appropriate, particularly
where there is controversy around specific accounting or disclosure practices. It has also been suggested
to us that regulatory staff have begun to develop more sophisticated methods of undertaking screening of
the RI population as a whole in order to identify emerging compliance concerns. One example of this is a
screening to examine if RIs exhibit unduly stable earnings patterns over the course of a number of CD
reviews. Such a finding might suggest that techniques of “earnings smoothing” are being employed.
More recently, staff have begun to undertake so-called “targeted reviews”, which apply to a sample of
issuers and relate to a particular industry, or result from policy developments or accounting standard
changes. In 2005, targeted reviews focused on whether auditors were registered with the CPAB, reviews
of restructuring costs, compliance with requirements to retain a previously granted exemption from NI
51-102, and compliance with the BAR requirements of NI 51-102.
In 2003 and 2004, OSC staff also introduced the innovation of “real-time reviews” for higher-risk
companies127. Unlike conventional CD reviews, the real-time review file remains open until staff’s
assessment of the issuer’s risk profile changes, and the class of material reviewed is larger, including
news articles and press releases, trading patterns, the issuer’s website and analyst calls. The advantage of
this style of review is that it “may identify patterns of behaviour not as readily evident when looking at an
issuer at a specific point in time128”. RIs are chosen for this form of review as a result of the accumulation
of so-called “red flags”, including prior restatements of financial results, the complexity of the business
model, or prior attention from a regulatory enforcement branch.
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The OSC’s risk-based assessment approach is mirrored by a similar approach taken at a national level,
whereby harmonized CSA-level CD review was introduced in 2004129. The CSA indicates that its riskbased approach will consider the potential damage that could occur to Canadian capital markets from
issuer failure to provide complete and timely disclosure. Interestingly, the CSA does not make its riskbased selection criteria public, with the exception of an indication that they will review large issuers130 or
those that have recently gone public. The former are to be reviewed once every three years; the latter,
within twelve months of their IPO. In May 2005, CSA staff announced their intention to conduct a review
of a sample of issuers with respect to their compliance with the rules concerning the composition and
responsibilities of audit committees under MI 52-110. The outcome of this review has not yet been
published.
Notice to the Market Concerning Systemic CD Issues
As well as resolving issuer-specific CD issues that arise as a result of the sampling process, both the CSA
and the OSC issue annual reports on their respective CD review programs. These contain general
discussion of systemic CD shortcomings uncovered by reviews of individual issuers131. Examples of
systemic deficiencies that have been raised by these reviews include the executive compensation and
retirement benefit disclosure, and disclosure issues in relation to income trusts. In 2005 OSC staff
reviewed the filings required by the new MI 52-109 and in general, “found compliance with the
requirements of the instrument”. 132
An optimistic note was sounded in OSC Staff Notice 51-712133, published in 2003, whereby regulators
concluded that “overall, we think the standard of disclosure is improving”. However some intractable
problems appear to persist across several annual reviews, such as revenue recognition and MD&A
deficiencies. With respect to revenue recognition, the OSC’s 2005 report indicated that many issuers fail
to clearly identify the specific triggers for revenue recognition that relate to the various aspects of their
operation. Particularly problematic were the recognition of up-front fees and the treatment of “right of
return” arrangements. On MD&A, many issuers were placed on the Refilings and Errors lists for MD&A
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deficiencies, as a result of failures to comparatively analyze their financial condition and results of
operation, and failures to disclose factors that caused variation over comparative periods.
Regulatory Options Following CD Compliance Reviews
A variety of outcomes are possible for an issuer following a regulatory review of its CD filings. These
outcomes can range from no changes being required to CD material, through commitments from issuers
to enhance some aspect of their disclosure in future filings, restatement and refiling of material, to
investigation for breach of securities law requirements. In 2005, for example, 80% of outcomes were
commitments to enhance future CD filings134. In its 2003 corporate finance annual report, OSC staff
suggested that they would take the quality of an issuer’s corporate governance practices into account in
deciding on the interval for a follow-up CD review.
With respect to the minority of issuers required to restate or refile CD material, the OSC created a
Refilings and Errors list in 2002. This posts names of issuers that restate and refile financial statements or
other CD documents, implement accounting or disclosure changes on a retroactive basis, or file
documents to correct an earlier non-filing. Once an issuer’s name is placed on this list, it is kept on it for
three years from the date of filing or refiling.
In OSC Staff Notice 51-708135, information was provided about the contextual factors used by corporate
finance staff to consider if further regulatory action, beyond the correction of deficiencies, is appropriate
in any particular case. Such factors include whether or not the issuer self-reported; the extent to which the
issuer co-operated with regulatory staff; whether the deficiency was an isolated incident or reflected
ongoing poor disclosure practices; if corrective action had been taken with respect to issuer internal
reporting processes; and the leadership demonstrated by the board of directors and audit committee.
For reporting issuers who fail to file the appropriate CD material in a timely fashion, close monitoring of
defaulting reporting issuers usually results, beginning with letters being written promptly to issuers who
have failed to file and the maintenance of a Reporting Issuers in Default list, followed up by a
management and insider cease-trade order (CTO). If there are large numbers of defaulters, staff may
consider further enforcement-based responses.
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8.

Further Steps to Promoting a Compliance Culture in CD

i.

Strategies for Regulatory Monitoring of CD Failure

While the risk-based approach to selecting RIs for CD review seems widespread internationally, a
sampling/targeting approach may fail to give a comprehensive picture of the state of compliance across
the issuer community, and may also operate to insulate RIs from a realistic concern that they may be
monitored. More specifically, with the introduction of MI 52-109 and NI 58-101, there is an opportunity
for the focus of regulatory compliance reviews to shift to reviewing the adequacy of issuers’ internal
systems for control and reporting rather than being primarily about substantive reviews of the various
types of CD material that is disclosed.
An important compliance-oriented achievement of MI 52-109’s requirements is that it could now be
possible to do systematic comparisons between a firm’s internal disclosure control and reporting system
and its actual CD output, to identify more precisely the causes of CD failure. This will only be possible,
of course, if regulators can obtain reliable information about those internal disclosure systems. We
recommend that regulators should strive to review as comprehensively as possible the internal disclosure
control systems in place within RIs, as an important contribution to improving CD practices. They could
ascertain information such as the nature of the CEO’s involvement in decision-making around disclosure,
the extent of an external auditor’s review of CD documents, or the processes in place to assure the
timeliness and accuracy of material change disclosure or the timely correction of errors. This form of
assessment may also provide more robust information with respect to market-wide compliance rates.
Recommendation #26: CD regulatory efforts should be refocused on reviewing internal control
systems, as opposed to primarily reviewing the content of specific CD documents.
Meanwhile, there is still a need to develop innovative strategies to deal with the areas of persistent
deficiency, such as revenue recognition practices and MD&A inadequacies. Although the nature of the
disclosure controls and procedures to be certified by RIs is unregulated, the regulators should provide
advice (perhaps in the form of best practice templates for issuers of varying size) about the elements of a
successful disclosure control and internal reporting system. It might therefore be most helpful if the
advice in this regard was targeted to areas of persistent disclosure deficiency, which as we have seen,
include MD&A disclosure and revenue recognition practices, as well as persistent failures to make timely
disclosure of material changes. Such best practice templates would likely be developed by the regulators
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themselves surveying the practices in existence among RI “compliance leaders” and suggesting
modifications to them for issuers of different sizes and complexity.
Recommendation #27: Regulators should enhance RI capabilities with respect to CD by developing
a series of best practice templates for successful disclosure control and reporting systems, targeted
to areas of persistent CD deficiency.
ii.

Link Between Regulatory Compliance Programs and Enforcement

In the context of the OSC, it appears that frequent and ongoing communication between CD compliance
staff and enforcement branch staff takes place. Much of this communication centers on decision-making
about regulatory action in specific instances of inadequate disclosure, with corporate finance personnel
often collaborating with enforcement staff on the preparation and investigation of enforcement files. In
line with the general approach taken in this research, we suggest that there be a greater focus by
regulators on the ways in which activities undertaken under the enforcement umbrella can more
effectively support the effort to achieve ongoing compliance by market participants with CD
requirements. One proposal here would be that sanctioning by regulators should routinely involve orders
that RIs review their internal disclosure procedures and controls, with the additional requirement that the
results of this review and the action to be taken be reported to the regulator. Compliance staff would then
be positioned to engage in more intensive review of the CD output of those firms on a going-forward
basis.
Recommendation #28: Enforcement sanctioning by regulators should routinely involve orders that
RIs review their internal disclosure procedures and controls, with the additional requirement that
the results of this review and the action to be taken be reported to the regulator.
Regulators may also wish to consider ways of extending their publicity about the fact that they retain lists
of RIs who have refiled, made disclosure errors or defaulted, as a salutary reminder to RIs of the negative
consequences of a lack of focus on maintaining appropriate disclosure practices.
Recommendation #29: Regulators should consider additional publicity concerning the existence
and content of the Reporting Issuers in Default and Refilings and Errors lists that they maintain.

67

iii.

Enhancing Firm-Level Compliance with CD Requirements

We suggest that, if they have not done so already, it is incumbent on issuers to uncover and analyze their
most important sources of internal risk of CD compliance failure. While these sources of risk will be
specific to individual issuers, a potentially common one - given recent rule enhancements in this area will be a lack of employee understanding of the need for internal disclosure procedures and how they
should be crafted. Issuers should begin to address their potential deficiencies here, bearing in mind that
educative needs may differ depending on the size and complexity of the issuer.
A further endemic source of risk is that organizational routines and incentives themselves may work
against the intent of CD rules. Thus it is possible that firms may be tempted to bypass their own
procedures or turn a blind eye to failure to abide by reporting or disclosure requirements, for reasons that
have to do with competitive business pressures or the need to maintain a high stock price. Strategies that
might be considered by firms to signal and maintain their commitment to improving and maintaining
appropriate disclosure practices include:
·

the introduction or extension of disclosure compliance committees at the board level.

As noted above a number of RIs have begun to establish such committees, though regulators have found
that the membership of such committees tends not to be as broadly-based and expert as it might be. Such
a sub-committee of the board would signal a high-level commitment on the part of the RI to instituting
and monitoring appropriate disclosure routines. Given that recent rule design has intensified the
requirements for the audit committee in relation to interim and annual financial disclosure, the
responsibilities of a disclosure committee might be more likely to centre on procedures for material
change disclosure, along with the approval of acquisition, corporate governance and general AIF
disclosure. It would obviously be necessary for a disclosure committee to liaise closely with the audit
committee if the membership did not overlap. Ultimately however, securities legislation assigns
responsibility for disclosure decisions and practices to the board as a whole.
·

the appointment of disclosure compliance officers in RIs, similar to the compliance officer role
performed within registrant firms.

As many of the persistent areas of deficiency in CD involve accounting practices, it would be helpful for
the incumbent of such a position to have accounting expertise. The appointment of such an individual
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would help to instantiate a disclosure-oriented culture within the organization on a day-to-day basis. The
compliance literature on the operation of such positions at registrant firms suggests that the incumbents of
these roles need to enjoy the full support of senior executives of the RI, in order for their activities not to
be regarded with suspicion by employees generally. It is of course true that the allocation of the resources
to staff such a position will impose additional costs on RIs, especially smaller reporting issuers.
·

our review of a sample of certificates required to be filed under MI 52-109 indicates that almost
no detail is provided in those certificates about the actual disclosure controls and procedures in
operation within RIs, and that the language of the certificates mimics that of the rule’s provisions
without going any further than that language.

It is unclear therefore to what extent internal procedures are being documented or are actually changing. It
is likely more appropriate for such information to be provided in MD&A material that is filed with the
regulators, but in line with our recommendation above that regulators now begin to collect data about the
nature of the internal disclosure procedures in place among RIs, we suggest that RIs themselves take
seriously the need to provide information about the practices they have adopted in this regard.
·

it is clear, however, that for disclosure controls and processes to work effectively, they need to be
instantiated at all levels of the organization’s operations, not just the board level or senior
management.

Thus governance experts suggest that risk assessment questionnaires should be routinely administered to
employees in individual departments of the firm, or more generally that internal disclosure and reporting
procedures should be built into the job descriptions of relevant employees, in order for a disclosureoriented organizational culture to take root.
Recommendation #30: Reporting issuers should be encouraged to participate in a number of
disclosure-related innovations, such as: disclosure sub-committees of the board; the appointment of
a disclosure compliance officer at senior management level; and enhanced disclosure in MD&A
documents about the existence and nature of internal disclosure control systems.
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9.

Conclusion

In undertaking this research, we have attempted to assess the power of a compliance-based approach to
securities regulation in achieving market integrity outcomes. We have pursued this by focusing on
specific areas of regulatory and investor concern, and considering the contribution that a variety of
compliance-type strategies could make to resolving intractable behavioural shortcomings in securities
markets.
As the executive summary indicates, we have made a variety of recommendations for more effective
deployment of compliance tools such as:
·

education programmes (abusive sales practices, insider trading and CD);

·

mandating written policies (insider trading);

·

changing approaches to compensation incentives (abusive sales practices and insider trading);

·

support for technological innovation (insider trading);

·

changing procedures for regulatory vetting of prospectuses (primary market disclosure);

·

enhanced regulatory data gathering and review of RI disclosure and financial reporting
procedures (CD);

·

regulatory production of templates concerning best practices in disclosure procedures (CD); and

·

the appointment of disclosure compliance officers (CD).

While we have suggested specific compliance strategies that seem most compatible with the regulatory
area under consideration, we would note that the academic literature on regulatory compliance strategies
warns that each method, considered in isolation, has shortcomings136. Thus for example, heavy-handed
monitoring strategies might de-motivate employees, who sense a lack of trust flowing from their
employer. The introduction of written policies needs to be accompanied by detailed ongoing
consideration of how to effectively implement the policy. The introduction of new disclosure controls
within RIs may impose non-trivial costs. This suggests to us that a comprehensive strategy would involve
a mix of the various rule design, monitoring and incentive-based approaches we have outlined above.
Nor should we be perceived as suggesting that traditional sanction-based enforcement has no role in the
achievement of market integrity outcomes. Obviously compliance strategies will sometimes fail,
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especially in relation to individuals or firms who have no allegiance to the long-term credibility of the
capital markets, and regulators need to be able to protect investor interests to the fullest extent possible.
However we do argue that reactive sanctioning is by itself unlikely to fully restore and maintain investor
confidence in the integrity of capital markets, especially in a world of complex market actors and
regulatory resource constraints.
One area we have not canvassed in detail, except with reference to enforcement action around CD
failures, is the possibility of combining traditional sanctioning together with ongoing compliance
processes137. Thus, various jurisdictions have experimented with innovations such as “deferred
prosecution agreements” (U.S.) or “enforceable undertakings” (Australia), which feature the deferral of
punitive sanctions in return for organizational action to institute new procedures to prevent further legal
infractions. A further related innovation is the idea of the so-called “reform undertaking” which would
feature, in the context of a regulatory settlement agreement, the retention by a firm of an independent
third-party consultant to identify internal compliance failures, report back to the regulator, and tailor
appropriate forward-looking reforms to organizational procedures138.
Such a marriage of enforcement and compliance undoubtedly warrants serious consideration in the
Canadian context, though it is possible that there are a number of challenges associated with it. Practically
speaking, it may be difficult to find the necessary cadre of third-party consultants who are independent of
the firms subject to the reform undertakings and prepared to devote the time and energy to such a
project139. More generally, this approach is likely to be only a partial solution to the achievement of
robust compliance rates within securities markets. A holistic, market-wide approach - rather than an
episodic approach - to compliance will be most useful, not least because comprehensive data collection
about overall compliance rates is an important way to render regulators themselves accountable for their
activities. If compliance rates are low, it behoves the regulator to think more carefully about the design of
the relevant rules or the strategies being used to encourage compliance.
Finally, we have noted earlier that a more complete assessment of the relative merits of a traditional
sanctioning approach and compliance-based regulatory strategies would require undertaking the
challenging task of a full accounting of the costs of compliance, at both the market participant and the
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regulatory level. Should part of the Task Force’s mandate be to identify areas for further research and
analysis, we would propose that this issue be taken seriously for the future.
Recommendation #31: Additional research should be sponsored to provide detailed calculation of
the costs of compliance with external regulatory and internal self-regulatory initiatives, as well as
its qualitative and quantifiable benefits.
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